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PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE-1957 TENNESSEE SURVEY
EDMUND M. MORGAN*
PLEADING
Generally: Pleadings are construed liberally in favor of the pleader,
and this is particularly true when the attack is made after judgment.
Thus, where the bill in a divorce action is challenged after final de-
cree on the ground that it fails to allege the jurisdictional requisite,
abandonment for more than one year next preceding the filing of the
bill, the court will construe it as so alleging an averment of volun-
tary, continuous abandonment for more than a year preceding the
filing. Such a construction prevents the decree from being void on
the face of the record. Hence it is not subject to attack for lack of
jurisdiction in a later proceeding for the admiinstration of the estate
of a woman who married the defendant after the decree became final.1
Use of Several Counts: It is entirely proper under prevailing prac-
tice to state the same cause of action in several counts, each setting
forth a different theory or ground of recovery; but they must not be
so framed as to make the declaration prolix and unduly repetitious.
If they are so framed, the trial judge may order some of them
stricken.
2
Where a pleading consists of several counts, pleas or replications,
the adverse party may interpose a single demurrer designating his
ground or grounds of demurrer to each count, plea or replication,
thus indicating that the demurrer is to be taken distributively. Or
he may interpose a separate demurrer to each count, plea or replica-
tion.
3
Same-Pleading Evidence of Ultimate Fact: In most jurisdictions
with a typical code, allegations of evidence from which the ultimate
fact may be deduced, whether or not the deduction is expressly
averred by the pleader, are insufficent against a demurrer for failure
to state a cause of action. The theory is that the pleading must show
that plaintiff does have a cause of action and not merely that he may
or may not have a cause depending upon the conclusion which may
be drawn by the trier of fact. The ruling of the chancellor in Delzell
* Frank C. Rand Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; Royall Professor
of Law Emeritus and Former Acting Dean, Harvard Law School; Reporter,
A.L.I. Model Code of Evidence; member, Supreme Court Advisory Committee
on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; co-editor, Morgan and Maguire, Cases
and Materials on Evidence (3d ed. 1951); author, Basic Problems of Evidence
(1954).
1. Stephenson v. Stephenson, 298 S.W.2d 36 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956).




v. Pope4 was consistent with .this theory. The bill set forth facts in
detail concerning prior employment and concluded with an allegation
of an implied contract of employment for one year. The chief justice
of the Supreme Court, speaking for the court, agreed with appellant's
counsel that the question was whether or not the bill alleged facts
which, if true, would justify a fair-and reasonable inference that there
was such an implied contract and reversed the decision of the chan-
cellor.
Same-Lack of Jurisdiction: A bill against agents of the state assert-
ing title to property as such agents and seeking a writ of mandamus
and an injunction to put complainant in possession of the property is
a suit against the state and is subject to demurrer. The court had no
jurisdiction to entertain such an action under Tennessee Code Anno-
tated Section 20-1702. Such a demurrer is not waived by filing it con-
temporaneously with an answer.5
Answer-Plea in Abatement: To an action brought in the Circuit
Court of Knox County, a plea of another action pending for the same
cause in the United States District Court is insufficient. And the gen-
eral rule that the pendency of another action for the same cause in
the court of another jurisdiction is not a ground of abatement is not
affected by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 13 (a), which re-
quires a claim arising out of the transaction which is the subject of
plaintiff's claim to be pleaded as a counterclaim. Also inapplicable is
the rule that, as between a federal court and a state court having
jurisdiction over the same matter, the court first acquiring jurisdiction
retains it.6
Same-Failure to Deny Incorporation: Where an answer failed to
deny under oath the allegation of corporate existence of plaintiff,
defendant could not later claim fraud because of plaintiff's failure to
disclose that plaintiff's charter had been revoked. Incidentally, the
court recognized the difficulty that arises when a judgment is en-
tered in favor of a non-existent plaintiff. To whom must the judgment
debtor, or the court officers after execution, pay the amount awarded?
A similar problem arises when the judgment is against a non-existent
corporate defendant: Against whom will execuion issue? Obviously
in both cases the record should by proper proceedings be made to
conform with the facts as to the identity of the party who has the
benefit or the obligation created by the judgment. The remedy is
not an action or other proceeding to set aside the judgment as void.
7
Replication-Right to Interpose: Where plaintiff's motion to strike
4. 294 S.W.2d 690 (Tenn. 1956).
5. Fritts v. Leech, 296 S.W.2d 834 (Tenn. 1956).
6. Hubbs v. Nichols, 298 S.W.2d 801 (Tenn. 1956).
7. Cravens v. Tanner, 291 S.W.2d 582 (Tenn. 1956).
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defendant's plea is denied, he must be given opportunity to reply. It
is error to dismiss the action as a result or as a part of the order strik-
ing the plea.8
Same-Departure: At common law and by the majority rule under
the codes a departure in a later pleading from the ground or theory
of the pleader in his earlier pleading is a defect of substance and sub-
ject. to demurrer; but if the opponent takes issue upon it, the defect
is cured by the verdict. And in some jurisdictions, as in Tennessee,
the defect is regarded as one of form. At common law, under the
formulary system, a departure from the form of action in the declara-
tion to another form in the replication was fatal and incurable. An
analogous situation is found in Staples v. Hamilton Nat'l Bank.0
Plaintiff alleged a breach of defendant's contract to pay money due
upon proper presentation by her of a check drawn against her account
in defendant bank. Defendant answered that it had paid out the
entire amount of her deposit upon checks previously drawn by her.
Plaintiff's reply alleged that she was an adjudged lunatic at the time
when the deposit was made and the previous checks drawn and paid.
On demurrer the court held that the replication was in effect an
equitable claim for recission of the entire transaction, and beyond
the jurisdiction of the circuit court. Such a departure is a defect of
substance, not of form.
PARTIES
Parties-Proper-Generally: A person who makes an unconditional
bid at a sale of realty ordered by the chancellor which is accepted be-
comes a party to the proceeding. If he secretly intends to buy only
after inspection and thereafter refuses to perform after inspection,
he is guilty of contempt of court.10
Same-In Proceeding for Administration of Estate: Decedent was
survived by her infant child. The mother of decedent is not the
proper party as petitioner for the appointment or removal of the
administrator of decedent's estate. The father, who had been divorced
from decedent, the child's mother, is a proper person to be appointed.'1
Same-Intervention: In a suit to compel a motor freight carrier to
receive goods for transportation to plaintiff and from plaintiff for
transportation to consignee, a labor union is not entitled to intervene
to challenge the jurisdiction of the court.12
Same-Necessary or Indispensable: A materialman whose contract
8. Wyatt v. Lassiter, 299 S.W.2d 229 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956).
9. 298 S.W.2d 24 (Tenn. 1956).
10. Matthews v. Eslinger, 292 S.W.2d 543 (Tenn. App. 1955) (en banc).
11. Lakins v. Isley, 292 S.W.2d 389 (Tenn. 1956).
12. National Carloading Corp. v. Arkansas Motor Freight Lines, 298 S.W.2d
720 (Tenn. 1957).
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is with an independent contractor for materials used in the construc-
tion of a house upon an owner's realty and who brings a bill against
the contractor and owner by attaching the realty, but fails for a year
thereafter to have process personally served upon the contractor, is
not entitled to a judgment pro confesso against the contractor and the
owner, and the chancellor may properly grant the owner's motion to
dismiss the attachment and leave pending the bill against the con-
tractor. In such a case the contractor is an indispensable party. In
the opinion it is said that the contractor is a necessary party but the
reason given makes him indispensable-namely, that the action can-
not be maintained without establishing both the debt and the lien.13
Same-Misjoinder: Although several owners of separate farms,
each damaged by defendant's wrongful interference with the flow of a
stream, are properly joined in seeking to secure an injunction against
the continuance of the interference, they are misjoined in seeking the
damages suffered by each of them by the interference. The rule which
allows a single owner in such a siutation to secure incidentaf damages
together with the injunction has no application. The chancellor
should have sustained defendant's demurrer for misjoinder of parties
to the separate claims for damages.14 It seems too clear for comment
that the rule in this case should be changed by statute; it requires
needless litigation. Of course, if counsel knows the rule and brings
a separate suit for each owner, avoidance of separate trials might be
accomplished by consolidation for trial.
Same-As Representative in a Derivative Action-Class Action:
A number of stockholders in an incorporated tobacco growers' asso-
ciation have no standing (a) to maintain an action against the corpora-
tion and its secretary for waste and mismanagement without first
having invoked action by the board of directors, unless it is shown
that such invocation would have been futile, or (b) to maintain an
action to recover for themselves and others similarly situated their
respective shares of a fund which they allege that the corporation
was obliged to distribute, but which the majority of the stockholders
did not desire to have distributed. The chancellor should decline to
entertain such an action as a class action.15
REMEDIES
Remedies-Certiorari to Circuit Court-From Judgment of Justice
of Peace: Certiorari from a judgment of a justice of the peace to the
circuit court in forma pauperis can be granted only after giving to the
13. Jordan v. Deitz, 296 S.W.2d 866 (Tenn. 1956).
14. Griffith v. Hurt 291 S.W.2d 271 (Tenn. 1956).
15. Range v. Tennessee Burley Tobacco Growers Ass'n, 298 S.W.2d 545
(Tenn. App. E.S. 1955).
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adverse party notice and opportunity to be heard. A writ granted ex
parte to the-judgment debtor by the justice is properly dismissed by
the circuit court.'6 I ,
Same-Same-From Beer Board Decision: After a Beer Board had
held a hearing, had heard witnesses and had postponed 
further con-
sideration, notifying defendant's attorney that the matter would not
come up at the next subsequently held meeting, it nevertheless con-
sidered the matter at that meeting, in the absence of defendant's attor-
ney and against the advice of the county solicitor, and revoked de-
fendant's license. On certiorari to the circuit court, that court should
have ruled that the hearing had not been completed and should have
remanded the case for further hearing and final action; it should not
have ordered the Board to reinstate the license.'
7
Same-Certiorari to Chancery Court-From Order of Commissionet
of Safety: Under the Tennessee Financial Responsibility Act,18 an
order of the Commissioner of Safety revoking a driver's license and
automobile registration is subject to review only on certiorari to
the Chancery Court of Davidson County. Section 59-713 (f) of the
Tennessee Code has application only where the revocation is of the
driver's license alone. 19
Same-Mandamus: A writ of mandamus will not issue against
officers or agents of the State of Tennessee to require them to put
complainant in possession of real estate claimed by him but in
possession of the officers or agents in their representative capacity.
The writ cannot be used as a substitute for an action of ejectment,
for no such proceeding can be entertained against the State.20
Same-Quo Warranto: Quo warranto was held to be the proper
remedy to challenge the eligibilty of members of the County Board
of Education of Lake County, who were members of the county court
and one of whom was also clerk and master of the chancery court of
the county. Section 49-209 of the Tennessee Code specifically makes
such persons ineligible, but chapter 334 of the Private Acts of 1929
purports to make them eligible. The constitutionality of this private
act was properly challenged in this proceeding and it was held to
be unconstitutional.
21
Same-Quo Warranto, In Nature of: The proceeding by private
individuals in the nature of quo warranto authorized by sections
6-301 to 6-319, of the Tennessee Code is an equitable proceeding. Con-
16. Lewis v. Simmons, 289 S.W.2d 702 (Tenn. 1956).
17. Chanaberry v. Gordy, 292 S.W.2d 18 (Tenn. 1956).
18. TENN. CODE AxN. § 59-1202 (1956).
19. Roney v. Luttrell, 292 S.W.2d 411 (Tenn. 1956).
20. Fritts v. Leech, 296 S.W.2d 834 (Tenn. 1956).
21. Algee v. State ex rel. Makin, 290 S.W.2d 869 (Tenn. 1956).
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sequently, the circuit judge is authorized in the exercise of his
discretion to allow an appeal to an order overruling a demurrer.
Same-Declaratory Judgment-Discretion of Trial Court: It is
not an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to refuse to render a
declaratory judgment as to whether a liability insurance company
is obliged to defend a pending personal injury action brought against
its insured even though the insured failed to give the insuror the
notice of the accident and injury as required by the policy. The
prayer for relief asked also that trial of the pending action be delayed
until the declaratory judgment was rendered. The purpose of the
Declaratory Judgment Law will not be furthered if a party is delayed
in the prosecution of an accrued cause of action until the termination
of proceedings for a declaratory judgment.23 In like manner a chan-
cellor may properly exercise his discretion to dismiss a bill filed by
a liability insurance company for a declaratory judgment that its
liability is limited to the amount stipulated in its policy, where the
issue is whether the insuror acted in good faith in its negotiations for
settlement. That issue raises questions aside from the construction
of the policy and would require trial of a controversy which in essence
is a tort action.
24
Same-Nonjudicial-Judges of Election: The judges of election
have sole authority to determine all objections to the reception of
the vote of any individual offering it. Chancery has no power to
determine this question by issuing an injunction against the reception
of the proffered vote or by ordering the tendered ballots to be im-
pounded prior to their reception.2
PRESUMPTIONS
Generally: The current opinions of our courts do little to dispel the
the confusion which afflicts the subject of presumptions generally.
Courts and legislatures continue to use the term "conclusive presump-
tions"; but when the latter do so, the court is required to determine
whether they mean what they say. For example, section 50-1013,
of the Tennessee Code (Workmen's Compensation Act), declares
that minor children are conclusively presumed to be dependent upon
their father. This was sensibly interpreted as having no application
to a situation in which the mother, an employee, was killed .in the
course of employment and the children actually dependent upon
her at the time were claimants, even though after her death the hus-
22. State ex rel. Southerland v. Town of Greenville, 297 S.W.2d 68 (Tenn.
1956).
23. Southern Fire & Cas. Co. v. Cooper, 292 S.W.2d 177 (Tenn., 1956).
24. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hammond, 290 S.W.2d 860 (Tenn.
1956).
25. Brown v. Thurman, 300 S.W.2d 883 (Tenn. 1957).
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band, their father, who had deserted the family, returned.26
The great Thayer more than half a century ago pointed out that
the so-called presumption of a lost grant based on long-continued user
or possession began as a mere justifiable inference, developed into a
so-called strong or weighty inference, then into a presumption or
required assumption in the absence of contrary evidence, and finally
into a so-called irrebuttable presumption or rule of substantive law.27
In dealing with the character of estate acquired by adverse possession,
the court of appeals resorted to this ancient presumption, asserting
that it did not include a presumption as to the intent of the fictitious
grantor, and repeated the common but unhelpful generalization that
one presumption may not be the basis of another.28 This, like the
analogous dogma that one inference cannot be based upon another,
is usually only a statement of the desired result rather than the
reason for it, for it is perfectly clear that in dealing with circum-
stantial evidence one inferred fact may be used as a basis for
inferring another fact. And there seems to be no reason why one
presumed fact cannot be made the basis for inferring or presuming
the existence of another fact.
Several opinions are consistent with the Thayer doctrine that the
procedural effect of a presumption is to put upon the opponent the
burden of seeing to it that there is evidence in the case, called the
burden of producing evidence, which would justify a finding of the
nonexistence of the presumed fact. Thus, in Hall v. State29 the trial
judge told the jury that the husband as head of the family was pre-
sumed to be "in possession of anything found in the home and
premises but this is a presumption of law merely and is effective as
proof only so long as there is an entire lack of evidence on that
point," and went on to charge that if the jury found beyond reason-
able doubt that the wife exercised any dominion or control over the
liquors, she would also be guilty. This charge was approved. The
common law presumption that the owner of a chattel is in possession of
it, 30 and the statutory presumption that an automobile registered in
a person's name is being operated and controlled by him3' were each
held to be applicable where the owner or registrant and another were
in the automobile at the time it crashed. The evidence in each case
did not justify an inference to the contrary and was not inconsistent
with the presumed fact. But it must be noted that in the former case
the court talked of a presumption or inference.
26. Johnson Coffee Co. v. McDonald, 143 Tenn. 505, 226 S.W. 215 (1921),
cited in Royal Indemnity Co. v. Jackson, 300 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tenn. 1957).
27. THAYER, PRELImARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 313 (1898).
28. Preston v. Smith, 293 S.W.2d 51, 60 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1955).
29. 292 S.W.2d 716, 719 (Tenn. 1956).
30. Moore v. Watkins, 293 S.W.2d 185 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956).
31. Ross v. Griggs, 296 S.W.2d 641 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1955).
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On the other hand, some opinions treat a presumption as affecting
the burden of persuasion. For example, in Briscoe v. Allison32 the
court approved a charge to the jury that "when a will is traced into
the testator's possession and at his death cannot be found or is found
mutilated, cancelled or defaced the presumption in the absence of
circumstances tending to show a contrary conclusion, is that the
testator destroyed it with the intention to revoke it," and that he
who seeks to overcome this presumption must do so "by adequate
proof." And the court at times talks in terms of presumption as
prima facie proof when consideration of the effect of the presumption
is unnecessary, as where the applicable statute expressly provides
that the burden is on the opponent to prove the nonexistence of the
presumed fact. Thus, where a statute, section 47-159 of the Tennessee
Code, put on the holder of a note the burden "to prove that he or
some person under whom he claims acquired the title as holder in
due course" when "it is shown that the title of any person who has
negotiated it is defective," the court talked of the presumption cre-
ated by proof of such a defective title and held it applicable whether
the maker of the note was seeking the affirmative relief of cancellation
or was merely defending an action upon the note.3 3 A fortiori whether
the language used is presumption or prima facie evidence, it has no
effect where the record conclusively shows the nonexistence of the
presumed fact.34
Same-Presumption of Innocence: In a proceeding to punish de-
fendant for criminal contempt of an injunction he is presumed to be
innocent until proved guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as he is in all
criminal prosecutions; but after conviction he is, on appeal, presumed
to be guilty, and he has the burden of overcoming this presumption.35
Same-Conflicting Presumptions-Validity of Ceremonial Marriage:
The presumption of the validity of a ceremonial marriage prevails
over both the presumption of continuance of life of a spouse of a
former marriage and over the presumption of the continuance of
status. Evidence of the husband, in an action by the wife for divorce,
that he had been formerly married and had never secured a divorce
from his former wife and that she had always lived in a specified
county and that there was no decree of dissolution of his marriage to
her in that county did not require the chancellor to find that the earlier
marriage was subsisting at the time of the later ceremonial marriage.6
The record indicates that the chancellor did not credit the testimony
of the husband concerning the residence of the former wife. This
32. 290 S.W.2d 864, 867 (Tenn. 1956).
33. Braswell v. Tindall, 294 S.W.2d 685 (Tenn. 1956).
34. Welch v. A.B.C. Coal Co., 293 S.W.2d 44 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956).
35. Davidson County v. Randall, 300 S.W.2d 618 (Tenn. 1957).
36. Rutledge v. Rutledge, 293 S.W.2d 21 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1953).
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decision is in accord with the weight of authority. Some courts hold
that in such a situation there is no applicable presumption; a few
others, that the presumption of continuance of the former marriage
prevails.37
BURDEN OF PROOF
Substantive or Procedural: In determining whether the law of the
locus delicti or the law of the forum is to govern in the application of
the generalization that the former governs substance and the latter
procedure, the allocation of the burden of proof, in the sense of burden
of persuading the trier of fact, is substantive. Hence in an action
brought in Tennessee for wrongful death caused by an accident in
Illinois, the law of Illinois as to that burden on the issue of contribu-
tory negligence is to be applied.38
Same-Allocation Under Sections 147, 155, 159 of the Tennessee Code:
The payee of a negotiable note which includes usurious interest ac-
quires only a defective title, and a transferee who acquires the note
before maturity has the burden of proving that he acquired title as
a holder in due course. This rule is applicable to bearer notes. In
Braswell v. Tindal139 the chancellor erroneously held that the inclu-
sion of usurious interest did not make the title defective. The court
of appeals held otherwise and on examining the evidence found that
the defendant had taken the notes in question in bad faith and with
full knowledge, and gave judgment to the plaintiff for the amount
of the usurious interest already paid and enjoined the collection of
a note not yet paid. The Supreme Court in an opinion upholding
the judgment of the court of appeals denied certiorari.
EVIDENCE
Relevance-Prior Custom: Evidence of prior practice in the opera-
tion of coupling railroad cars is relevant and admissible as tending to
show its feasibility and safety. In an action for injuries caused by a
plug blown out by steam pressure in coupling under the current
practice it is entirely proper to admit testimony of the earlier practice
of cutting off steam while couplings were being made.
40
Same-Subsequent Repairs: In an action in which the issue was
negligence in stretching a rope across a walk or apron of a swimming
pool without signs or other means of making its presence clearly
observable, the trial judge admitted photographs of the locus made
after the guard towers and posts to which the rope was attached had
37. See cases collected in Annots., 34 A L.R. 464, 483-490 (1925); 77 A.L.R.
729, 738-40 (1932); 14 A.L.R.2d 735-45 (1951).
38. Gordon's Transports v. Bailey, 294 S.W.2d 313 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956).
39. 294 S.W.2d 685 (Tenn. 1956).
40. Thurmer v. Southern Ry., 293 S.W.2d 600 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956).
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been repainted in alternating stripes of black and white. -In other
respects the photographs were accurate pictures of conditions at
the time of the accident in question. The court of appeals held that
the trial judge had not abused his discretion, rejecting as mere specula-
tion defendant's argument that the jury inferred from the pictures
that defendant in repainting had been remedying a defective condi-
tion.41
Same-Other Crimes or Wrongs: Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule
55 provides in substance that evidence that a person committed a
crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion is inadmissible to prove
his disposition to commit crime or civil wrong on another specified
occasion but is admissible when relevant to prove some other material
fact including absence of mistake or accident, motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge or identity. It is believed that
this represents the generally accepted law although the usual state-
ment is that such evidence is inadmissible except when offered to
prove one or more of a list of specified matters, most of which are
mentioned in the concluding phrase of Rule 55. Illustrations are
found in recent opinions of the Tennessee Supreme Court. When a
defendant was charged with a violation of the liquor law and it was
the function of the jury to fix the punishment, evidence that he had
committed other similar offenses, though inadmissible as tending to
prove his guilt, was properly admitted after he had been found guilty
to enable the jury to determine what his punishment should be.
42
Again, in a prosecution for burglary of one supermarket, evidence
that the accused was engaged in an attempt to burglarize another
supermarket on the same night, tending to show his participation in
a scheme or plan or joint venture to which an accomplice testified,
was admissible.43 A striking example is found in Gibbs v. State.4
An otherwise admissible confession of the deliberate killing of a
woman was not rendered inadmissible by inclusion therein of a
confession that accused first compelled her to kill her baby and then
shot her to prevent her disclosure of his murder of her husband, and
soon thereafter killed her daughter to prevent the daughter's dis-
closure of the murder of her mother. The same principle was applied
in a proceeding to revoke the suspension of sentence of a parolee for
violation of parole. The notice to him listed specific instances of
violation and included a general statement of violative conduct. In
such a proceeding all that is required is that the parolee "shall have a
chance to say his say before the word of his pursuers is received to
41. Management Services v. HellInan, 289 S.W.2d 711 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1955).
42. McBride v. State, 290 S.W.2d 648 (Tenn. 1956). See MORGAN, BASIC
PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 188 (1954).
43. Jones v. State, 292 S.W.2d 767 (Tenn. 1956).
44. 300 S.W.2d 890 (Tenn. 1957).
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his undoing."45 All that need be made known to him is what in
general he has to answer. Hence, the evidence is not limited by the
enumeration of specific instances. The proceeding is not a criminal
or civil action.4
Opinion-Lay Opinion: Among the subjects concerning which a
lay witness may give his opinion after testifying to the facts upon
which it is based are his own physical ability to work, including
even the extent of his disability,47 and the value of his own services.48
In like manner he may testify to the identity and condition of another.
Thus, he may testify that an accused is the same person whom he
saw and heard talking on a previous occasion, that on the former
occasion he smelled on that person's breath the odor of intoxicants and
observed his manner of speech and conduct and that the person was
drunk.49
Hearsay-Admissions-Function of Judge and Jury: Kunk v. How-
ell 50 raises an interesting question concerning the function of the
judge when evidence of a declaration is offered as an admission and
the identity of the declarant is in dispute-a question rarely, if ever,
thoroughly debated.5' It is clear that a statement, by one other than
a party, offered to prove its truth is pure hearsay and that a statement
by a party offered against him is admissible as an exception to the
hearsay rule. Theoretically, by the orthodox rule, which Tennessee
courts usually apply, the identity of the declarant should be deter-
mined by the judge. But the court of appeals ruled that it should be
determined by the jury where the evidence, either circumstantial or
direct, was in dispute and upheld the ruling admitting the declaration
in evidence. It seems to be assumed that the judge submitted the
question to the jury with pertinent instructions.
Same-Admission by Nonverbal Conduct: In considering the suf-
ficiency of evidence to support the trial judge's refusal to direct a
verdict, the court of appeals ruled that defendant's unexplained
failure to call its employee, a guard, who witnessed the accident, justi-
fied the inference that his evidence would not have contradicted the
testimony of other eye witnesses. This is no doubt in accord with the
accepted rule. Qualification and conflict arise when such evidence is
offered as affirmative proof of the fact not disclosed or purposely sup-
pressed.52
45. Hooper v. State, 297 S.W.2d 78, 81 (Tenn. 1956).
46. Ibid.
47. Hamlin & Allman Iron Works v. Jones, 292 S.W.2d 27 (Tenn. 1956).
48. Murray v. Grissim, 290 S.W.2d 888 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956).
49. Hopson v. State, 299 S.W.2d 11 (Tenn. 1957).
50. 289 S.W.2d 874 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956).
51. See MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 244 (1954).
52. Management Services v. Hellman, 289 S.W.2d 711 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1955).
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Same-Vicarious Admission: A statement made by defendant's
foreman while visiting an injured plaintiff for the purpose of getting
a statement from him as to how the accident occurred was held to
have been properly excluded.53 The court of appeals said: "To be
admissible against the principal the declarations or admissions of the
agent must relate to the act he is performing for the principal at the
time the declaration or admission is made."5 4 It is suggested that the
court might well have explained the inapplicability of this generaliza-
tion. Surely the foreman was a speaking agent. He was not to act as
a mere stenographer; and in order to induce plaintiff to talk he might
well have had to give his own version of the circumstances. The rule
stated is derived from cases where the agent is performing some
authorized act other than narration and makes an explanatory asser-
tion. Of course, it may be that the statement was clearly without the
express or implied or incidental authority of the foreman, but this is
not necessarily so. In Kendall Oil Co. v. Payne,55 it was perfectly
clear that the unidentified employee had no authority to speak as to
the custom of defendant with reference to washing the service station
floors.
Same-Confession-Improper Inducement: A confession is not so
improperly induced as to be inadmissible merely because an officer
told the accused while she was being questioned that it would be
better for her to tell the truth, where it appears tilat the physical
surroundings were "not conducive to the begetting of fear. '56 The
court points out that an inducement to tell the truth cannot produce
a false confession. It concedes that a number of courts have a rule of
thumb to the contrary. There is no suggestion that the circumstances
may not indicate that these innocuous words may be used as an im-
proper inducement to tell what the questioner desires to have the
accused admit to be the truth. There may be physical or other cir-
cumstances indicating coercion or other vitiating inducement.
Same-Same-Functions of Judge and Jury: When there is a dispute
in the evidence as to whether the confession was improperly induced,
the question of admissibility is to be decided by the judge; with that
the jury has nothing to do. If the judge admits the confession, the
jury is to determine its weight, and evidence of all the circumstance
in which it was secured is admissible for consideration by the jury.
Hence, in Nelson v. State5 7 the judge erred in ruling that none of the
evidence submitted to the court on the preliminary issue as to hope
or fear or promise or threat was admissible. After this ruling he
53. Thurmer v. Southern Ry., 293 S.W.2d 600 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956).
54. Id. at 604.
55. 293 S.W.2d 40 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1955).
56. Barksdale v. State, 292 S.W.2d 193, 195 (Tenn. 1956).
57. 292 S.W.2d 727 (Tenn. 1956).
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stated to counsel: "But as I say you are entitled to go on and ask
questions about the manner in which it is obtained or how it was
obtained, but whenever that question requires an answer that goes
to the point of force or threats or promises or hope of reward or im-
munity or anything like that, it is a matter not competent for the
jury to hear and I will sustain the objection." 58 Because counsel did
not offer any evidence "along this line" and did not preserve the evi-
dence that he intended to offer before the jury, the court held that
it was impossible to determine that the error was prejudicial. With
due respect, it is suggested that it would have been futile, if not
misconduct, for counsel to have offered any of the forbidden testimony
and that the ruling of the judge seems to have assumed that he be-
lieved counsel had indicated an intention to present such evidence.
Same-Spontaneous Statement: In two opinions the Court of Ap-
peals, for the Eastern and Western Sections respectively, dealt with
the admissibility of statements made contemporaneously with the
event, which they described or explained, or made spontaneously,
using the confusing phrase res gestae. The eastern section was dealing
with the typical personal injury case where the injured person states
the cause of his injury while still at the scene and while still suffering
so that there is no reason to suspect fabrication. There were three
statements, one made spontaneously and the others in answer to
inquiries. As to the latter, the court said in effect that it was for the
trial judge to determine whether there was likelihood of fabrication;
as to the former it had no doubt.59 The result is in accord with
myriads of decisions in other jurisdictions. In the case in the western
section the ruling is in strict accord with the Thayer doctrine which
regards substantial contemporaneity as the test. Of course, when a
person describes what he is then observing, there is an element of
spontaneity; there is usually also an opportunity for his auditor to
check the accuracy of the statement. The Thayer theory applies
wherever the event or condition is relevant, whether or not it is
the matter or part of the matter in issue or only circumstantial evi-
dence of the matter. In the instant case 60 a physician was examining
an X-ray film of the back of a patient made about nine months after
an operation by defendant. As reported by the witness, the physician
said: "He certainly did take a big chunk out of your spine." The
assignment of error of the trial judge's ruling excluding evidence of
this statement was that the doctor's "spontaneous exclamation" was
"a part of the res gestae of his examination." The court, citing several
cases involving exciting events and statements made within a few
58. Id. at 730.
59. Management Services v. Hellman, 289 S.W.2d 711 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1955).
60. Hall v. De Saussure, 297 S.W.2d 81 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956).
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mihutes thereafter, held that the evidence should have been admitted
as part of the res gestae. Now, it must be clear that the statement was
no part of his examination of the patient; but it was a statement of the
appearance of the X-ray picture expressed in terms, not of what it
actually contained, but what had been done to the subject of the
picture. If offered for the truth of the statement-that is, to show what
the defendant had done-it is the clearest kind of hearsay and not
within any imaginable exception. If offered to show that the X-ray
film pictured the spine with "a big chunk" missing and if the necessary
foundation was laid to make the film admissible, the ruling is an
excellent example of application of the Thayer theory; but the cited
cases are not in point, and there is nothing in the opinion to indicate
the issue upon which it was offered. Consequently it is impossible to
evaluate the decision as a precedent.
Same-Fresh Complaint in Sex Offenses: In a prosecution for
sodomy committed upon a seven-year-old boy with his consent, the
trial court admitted evidence of a detailed statement of the boy made
to his father, upon inquiry by the father as to the source of the money
with Which the boy had bought cakes and candy. The Supreme Court
affirmed in an unsatisfactory opinion which says only that it is well
settled that in such a case evidence of a detailed statement made
within a reasonable time after the event is admissible.61 It gives no
reasorf. It cites an Arizona case in which the statement was clearly
spontaneous.62 Curtis v. State,63 the latest Tennessee case cited, con-
tains a dictum indicating that such a statement is admissible for its
truth in corroboration of the prosecuting witness, while two earlier
Tennessee cases appear to hold such evidence receivable only as
rehabilitating and not for their truth. The opinion reflects the un-
certainty exhibited in judicial decisions generally.
Same-Declaration of Intent: A like use of the unintelligible term,
res gestae, is found in Nichols v. State,64 where the court in a prosecu-
tion for murder held admissible evidence of a declaration of intent by
the decedent to do a relevant act, namely, to sell his property for cash.
It was said that the declaration was a part of the res gestate of a trip
by decedent and of his transaction with reference to his property.
There were several declarations, some of which did not accompany
any relevant event. There is now a well recognized exception to the
hearsay rule which admits declarations of a presently existing state
of mind, including intent, made without circumstances of suspicion,
and the use of this Latin phrase, which has been condemned by com-
61. Johnson v. State, 296 S.W.2d 832 (Tenn. 1956).
62. Soto v. Territory, 12 Ariz. 36, 94 Pac. 1104 (1908)
0. 167 Term. 430, 70 S.W.2d 364 (1934).
64. 289 S.W.2d 849 (Tenn. 1956).
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mentators and the most distinguished judges, serves no purpose other
than to obscure the discussion. The Court cited Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Hillmon65 and Ford v. State,66 both of which admit evidence of
declarations of intent as tending to prove later conduct in execution
of the intent although the execution involved inferences as to conduct
of another. These are most liberal decisions, and their effect ought
not to be clouded by foggy phrases, which may be misleading as to the
value of the cases as precedents.
Same-Parol Evidence Rule: In remanding a case for retrial the
court of appeals, speaking with reference to an issue which would
probably be correctly raised in the trial court, said that testimony as
to whether a covenant not to sue a named tortfeasor was by contem-
poraneous oral agreement in fact a release from liability could not be
received as tending to prove that it was a release as between the
plaintiff and the covenantee tortfeasor, but that it was receivable
against the plaintiff in favor of other persons whom plaintiff was suing
as joint tortfeasors of the covenantee. 67 It quoted "The rule that parol
contemporaneous evidence is not admissible to alter or vary the terms
of a valid written instrument has reference only to the parties to the
instrument."68
WITNESSES
Required Witnesses-Will Contest: In a will contest all attesting
witnesses must be called or be shown to the judge to be unavailable.
If an available attester is not called, no issue as to the testator's com-
petency can be properly tried.69
Examination-Time and Form of Objections-To Depositions: Ex-
ceptions to a deposition must assign reasons to support them. If such
reasons are omitted, the trial court is warranted in overruling the
exceptions.70
Same-Same-To Testimony-General and Specific: When an ob-
jection, amounting only to a general objection, is interposed and is
overruled, the ruling will not be examined on appeal; if the objector
specifies a particular ground and that ground does not exist, he may
not, on appeal, rely upon any other ground. Thus, where his objection
to a hypothetical question was that "no human being on earth could
65. 145 U.S. 285 (1892).
66. 184 Tenn. 443, 201 S.W.2d 539 (1945).
67. Wyatt v. Lassiter, 299 S.W.2d 229 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956). For a brief
statement and reference to leading treatises, see MORGAN, BAsIc PROBLEMS OF
EVIDENCE 354 (1954).
68. Wyatt v. Lassiter, supra note 64 at 237; Nashville Interurban Ry. v.
Gregory, 137 Tenn. 422, 437, 193 S.W. 1053, 1056 (1917).
69. Swindoll v. Jones, 292 S.W.2d 531 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1954).
70. Agar Packing and Provision Co. v. Weldon, 300 S.W.2d 51 (Tenn. App.
W.S. 1956).
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answer that question with all those answers" and "it's going into the
realm of what a jury should decide in this case," he could not on
appeal urge that the question did not contain a correct statement of
all the facts.
71
Same-Objection Too Broad: Where five cases growing out of the
same accident were consolidated for trial, three of which were by
or against the administrator of the objecting party, his objection that
evidence of statements of his decedent was inadmissible under the
so-called Dead Man's Statute was properly overruled since the statute
had no application to two of the actions and he did not limit his ob-
jection to the three cases to which it was applicable.7 2
Competency-Dead Man Statute: In an action against the adninis-
trator of decedent for wrongful injury, plaintiff is competent to
testify that she was riding in an automobile which was being driven
by the administrator's intestate at a speed of ninety miles per hour
and that it overturned, killing the driver and injuring plaintiff. These
are facts open to the observation of all persons, and the word "trans-
action" in the Dead Man Statute,7 3 while applicable to torts as well
as contracts, is not to be construed as applicable to such "independent"
facts. It does, however, cover the fact of the relationship between
plaintiff and intestate as, for example, whether plaintiff was intestate's
guest or a passenger for hire, or an unwilling passenger. The statute
should be strictly construed and should not be given wide application.74
Same-Juror Regarding Verdict: The trial judge properly refuses
to hear a juror on being polled as to his reasons for his agreeing to
the verdict and later properly refuses to hear his testimony or consider
his affidavits as to those reasons. 75
Privilege-Against Self-Incrimination: In a disbarment proceeding
the defending attorney is entitled to the benefit of his privilege against
self-incrimination, but an order which directs him either to produce
specified letters or other matter or to claim the privilege as a reason
for not doing so does not violate the privilege.76
Impeachment-Effect: The fact that a witness left the property of
the accused owing him several hundred dollars did not affect his
competency to testify to an admission of guilt by the accused; it
affected only his credibility.7 7 The same is true where the impeaching
71. McKamey v. Andrews, 289 S.W.2d 704 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1955).
72. Ibid.
73. TENN. CoDE ANN. § 24-105 (1956).
74. Christofiel v. Johnson, 290 S.W.2d 215 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956).
75. Dixon Stave & Heading Co. v. Archer, 291 S.W.2d 603 (Tenn. App. E.S.
1956).
76. Memphis & Shelby County Bar Ass'n v. Vick, 290 S.W.2d 871 (Tenn. App.
W.S. 1955).
77. Nichols v. State, 289 S.W.2d 849 (Tenn. 1956).
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fact is a statement contrary to his testimony, made some two years
after the event and before the trial or hearing.78
Rehabilitation-Prior Consistent Statements: Where the defendant
has attempted on cross-examination to show that the testimony of the
witness was the result of persuasion by his mother and the prosecutor,
evidence that the witness had on the day of the event in question told
substantially the same story as that given in his testimony is admis-
sible. It tends to show that the testimony was not induced by the
alleged persuasion.79 This is a well recognized qualification of the
rule that a prior consistent statement is not in ordinary circumstances
admissible to rehabilitate a witness who has been impeached by evi-
dence of.prior inconsistent statements.
JUDIcIAL NOTICE
Laws of Tennessee and of Sister States: A court of a state is bound
to take judicial notice of the common law and public statutes of the
state, but the orthodox rule treats the decisional and statutory law
of a sister state as a fact to be proved by evidence as other facts are
proved. In Tennessee the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law
Act has'been adopted,80 requiring its courts to take judicial notice of
the laws of sister states, but not of foreign countries, where the ad-
verse party has been given notice of his opponent's intention to rely
thereon in the pleadings or otherwise. A written notice of the
statute and judicial decisions of the sister state to be relied on is
sufficient.81
Laws of Nature and Arithmetical Computations: The court judicially
knows that an automobile traveling at the rate of thirty miles an
hour will travel four and four-tenths feet in one-tenth of a second
and that in a collision between a vehicle weighing 52,000 pounds and
one weighing 4,000 pounds, the former will keep in motion and push
the latter some distance. When an expert so testifies, the court may
take judicial notice of the truth of his testimony. The foregoing is
in effect the ruling of the court of appeals in Gordon's Transports v.
Bailey.82
Propositions of Generalized Knowledge and the Existence of Specific
Facts: Propositions and facts that are so commonly known or notorious
as not to be the subject of intelligent dispute in the community are
judicially noticed. Thus the court judicially knows that the City of
Memphis is located in Shelby County. As a result it follows that an
78. VoIz v. Southerland, 292 S.W.2d 385 (Tenn. 1956).
79. Farmer v. State, 296 S.W.2d 879 (Tenn. 1956).
80. TENN. CODE Axx. § 24-607 (1956).




allegation that an offense was committed in the City of Memphis is
the equivalent of an allegation that it occurred in Shelby County,
and evidence from which it may be inferred that it occurred in that
county is sufficient. 83 Furthermore, a variance as to the place within
the county would not be material. In Kingsport Utilities v. Brown
84
the court ruled that it had been common knowledge "for the past 15
years at least, that massive machinery and cranes with tall booms are
more commonly used in construction work than other methods in
excavating, road building, bridge building, construction of office
buildings, hospitals, etc." Consequently public utilities using over-
head wires carrying heavy current must take this fact into considera-
tion in providing insulation for such wires. At times the proposition
judicially noticed is inaccurately phrased. Thus, it is doubtless true
that a court judicially knows that money received by a woman for
the support of children of her first and second marriages while she
is living with her third husband is likely to be used together with
her current earnings for the general support of the family, but the
court was certainly speaking loosely when it said that it judicially
knew that the woman in question would so use it.85
Facts Capable of Immediate Demonstration: The court of appeals
takes judicial notice of its own former opinion and decision at a
prior stage of the same litigation.86 It seems self-evident that a court's
own records, particularly those pertaining to all stages of the pending
case and cases arising out of the same transaction or occurrence,
should be subject to judicial notice. Wigmore thinks that even this
imposes too great a burden on the judges of a modern court, but it is
suggested that the matter is not open to reasonable dispute and that
the sources are not too difficult to produce with the aid of counsel.
Of course, the judge can insist that counsel make the necessary search;
but when the materials are produced or found by the judge, the proc-
ess of using them should be that applicable to judicial notice and not
that applicable to the introduction of evidence.87
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
Jurisdiction Over Person-Effect of Appearance: A garnishee who
appears and discloses that he is indebted to the defendant in a named
sum and makes no objection concerning the service of the garnishee
summons waives all defects therein, if any, and subjects himself to
83. Hopson v. State, 299 S.W.2d 11, 14 (Tenn. 1957).
84. 299 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tenn. 1955).
85. See Pruett v. Pruett, 291 S.W.2d 278, 285 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956).
86. Memphis & Shelby County Bar Ass'n v. Vick, 290 S.W.2d 871, 875 (Tenn.
App. W.S. 1955).
87. See MORGAN, BAsIc PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 10 (1954).
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the jurisdiction of the court.88 This is, of course, in complete accord
with the multitude of decisions dealing with the effect of responding
to the merits as a general appearance.
Illustrations are found in Wyatt v. Lassiter89 where a cross-defend-
ant appeared and participated in the trial without objection, and
Clements v. Morgan9 where petitioner for adoption was given no
notice of intervention but was given full opportunity to be heard
while present at the hearing.
Jurisdiction Over Subject Matter-Generally: Where an insurance
policy provides for the appointment of an umpire to be selected by a
judge of a court of record at the request of either insured or insuror,
the judge who makes the appointment is not acting as a court and
his order need recite no jurisdictional facts.9'
Same-Local Action: A court in Tennessee has no jurisdiction over
an action for injury to real property located in Georgia when the
cause of the injury also occurred in Georgia, and it is immaterial
whether the count alleges trespass quare clausum or negligence or
nuisance.92 This is the accepted common law rule in the overwhelming
majority of American jurisdictions.
Same-Judgment of United States Court: A state court of Tennessee
has no jurisdiction to enjoin the enforcement of a judgment of a
United States District Court rendered in compliance with a decision
of the Supreme Court of the United States. 93 This would have seemed
too clear to be the subject of serious litigation had it not been actually
seriously disputed.
Same-Continuance of Jurisdiction: As between a court of Ten-
nessee and a United States court with concurrent jurisdiction, the
court first acquiring jurisdiction retains it to the exclusion of the other
1court.9 And in Tennessee the court which in the exercise of its
jurisdiction grants a divorce retains the power to enter or modify
the decree providing for the custody or support of a child of the
marriage.95
Same-Chancery Court: Martin v. Martin96 presented an inter-
esting problem of jurisdiction over a judgment previously rendered
in a circuit court. While the parties were husband and wife residing
in Pennsylvania, a court of that state entered a decree requiring him
88. Stonecipher v. Knoxville Say. & Loan Ass'n, 298 S.W.2d 785 (Tenn. App.
E.S. 1956).
89. 299 S.W.2d 229 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956).
90. 296 S.W.2d 874 (Tenn. 1956).
91. Agricultural Ins. Co. v. Holter, 299 S.W.2d 15 (Tenn. 1957).
92. McCormick v. Brown, 297 S.W.2d 91 (Tenn. 1956).
93. Roy v. Brittain, 297 S.W.2d 72 (Tenn. 1956).
94. Ibid.
95. Roble v. Roble, 295 S.W.2d 817 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956).
96. 292 S.W.2d 9 (Tenn. 1956).
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to make payments for her maintenance. Thereafter in 1951 he came
to Tennesssee and secured a divorce in the circuit court sitting in
Johnson City. The wife did not discover the existence of the divorce
decree until the husband was in the military service "beyond the
jurisdiction of the United States." She brought suit in chancery at
Johnson City to set aside the divorce as fraudulently obtained and
made service by publication. After a decree in her favor, the husband
appeared specially, contending that the court did not and could not
secure jurisdiction by service by publication. The Supreme Court
held that the judgment of divorce was a res within the State and that
the chancellor had jurisdiction of the res so that service by publication
was sufficient.
But a court of chancery has no power to enjoin election commis-
sioners from delivering ballots to various precincts or to impound
ballots in their hands intended to be cast in a forthcoming election
as votes of absentee voters. It cannot conduct an election contest
under the guise of an injunction proceeding.97
Same-Same-Administration of Estate Involving Interest of In-
competent: On suggestion of insolvency of the estate in the county
court, the cause was transferred to chancery. The chancellor, after
appointment of a guardian of an incompetent, who was brought in by
service by publication, ordered a partition of real estate by private
sale. After a decree that the clerk and master deliver a deed to the
purchasers at the sale, a so-called next friend filed a petition in inter-
vention challenging the jurisdiction of the court. The petition was
dismissed. The court of appeals held (1) that chancery obtained
jurisdiction when the suggestion of insolvency was filed and there-
after retained it and (2) that chancery had jurisdiction over the prop-
erty and the incompetent's interest therein and had inherent power
to make such disposition of that interest as it deemed best for her
protection. Errors in the proceeding, if any, did not affect the court's
jurisdiction.98
Same-Circuit Court: The circuit court may hear and determine an
equitable cause when its jurisdiction to do so is not challenged by
demurrer. The circuit judge acts as a chancellor. He has authority
to transfer the case to chancery but is under no duty to do so.9 On
an appeal from the county court, the circuit court has no power to
grant letters of administration; its powers are revisory only.100
Same--County Court: The county court has exclusive jurisdiction to
determine whether a person purporting to act as chairman of the
97. Brown v. Thurman, 300 S.W.2d 883 (Tenn. 1957).
98. Goins v. Yowell, 293 S.W.2d 251 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956).
99. Brigham v. Southern Trust Co., 300 S.W.2d 880 (Tenn. 1957).
100. Lakins v. Isley, 292 S.W.2d 389 (Tenn. 1956).
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beer committee is a member of that committee. A person who has
been ordered to show cause why his beer permit should not be re-
voked cannot raise that question before the committee. 1°1
Same-Supreme Court on Certiorari: Until a petition for certiorari
has been granted, the Supreme Court has no power to determine the
applicable law or to render an advisory opinion in the litigation. There-
fore, anything stated in a memorandum opinion denying the petition
which might or would be applicable in a new trial is of no effect.102
Same-Venue in Criminal Prosecution: Section 9 of article 1 of the
Constitution of Tennessee confers on an accused the right to demand
a speedy trial by an impartial jury of the county in which the crime
shall have been committed. This has been uniformly construed as
preventing the legislature from conferring judicial jurisdiction to
try an offense committed outside the county, no matter how close to
the boundary. Therefore, under a statute prohibiting the transporta-
tion of liquor in a dry county, the court of a wet county has no power
to try a defendant, against his objection, upon a charge of having
transported liquor through a dry county into the wet county even
though the transportation is intended to terminate in another dry
county.103 In one part of the opinion the Court says: "This is a venue
question. . . . The question here is, in what county should he be
tried."1 4 It concludes, however: "[A]s we view it no crime as laid in
the indictment was committed in Hamilton County [a wet county]
and therefore this county had no jurisdiction to try the plaintiff in
error."1 05 The case presents a very unusual situation; the accused
had committed no crime in Hamilton County. If the court in Hamil-
ton County had no jurisdiction of the subject matter, the defendant
could not confer it by consent; yet the constitutional provision in
terms confers a right and the court assumes that the venue could
have been changed on application or consent of the accused in the
same way that personal rights, including venue generally, may be
waived. The situation suggests the problem raised in actions for
damages for injury to realty located in another state. If accused had
not raised the question of venue, and the indictment had disclosed the
place of the offense, would a judgment of conviction have been void
on its face?
TRIAL
Right of Accused to Counsel: In a habeas corpus proceeding the
court conceded that where counsel is appointed for two indigent
10i. Jones v. Sullivan County Beer Board, 292 S.W.2d 185 (Tenn. 1956).
102. Kendall Oil Co. v. Payne, 293 S.W.2d 43 (Tenn. 1956).
103. Chadwick v. State, 296 S.W.2d 857 (Tenn. 1956).
104. Id. at 859.
105. Id. at 861.
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defendants, each is entitled to separate counsel if their interests are
conflicting. In the instant case'06 the record failed to show any claim of
conflict of interest, and there was evidence that the relator did have
separate counsel. Consequently, his right to counsel was not infringed.
Right to Jury Trial-Accused in Criminal Prosecution: Section 14
of article 6 of the Constitution of Tennessee provides that "no fine shall
be laid on any citizen of this State that shall exceed fifty dollars
unless it shall be assessed by a jury of his peers, who shall assess the
fine at the time they find the fact, if they think the fine should be more
than fifty dollars." The jury in the instant case found defendant
guilty of assault and battery with intent to commit voluntary man-
slaughter, and assessed as punishment imprisonment and a fine ex-
ceeding fifty dollars. The court construed the indictment as charging
only assault and battery, ruled that the verdict was effective as a
finding of guilt of that offense, and ordered the case remanded with
directions that the trial judge empanel a jury to assess the punishment
only for the offense of assault and battery. It held specifically that
neither the constitutional right to trial by jury set forth in article 1,
section 9, nor article 14, section 6, quoted above, requires that the
finding of guilt and the assessment of the fine should be by the same
jury.0 7 The opinion, it is submitted, reflects a sound policy of pre-
serving carefully all substantial rights of an accused and disregarding
irregularities in the proceedings which do not materially affect those
rights.
Same-Same-Law and Fact: Section 19 of article 1 of the Tennessee
Constitution has proved difficult of application. It provides that "in
all indictments for libel, the jury shall have a right to determine the
law and the facts under the direction of the court, as in other criminal
cases." In Dykes v. State'0 8 the court held flatly and without qualifica-
tion that it is error, which cannot be harmless and is therefore re-
versible, to charge the jury that they "are the sole judges of the
evidence and the weight to be given to the swearing of each and
every witness in the case, but the law you will take as given you by
the Court." Ford v. State'0 9 overruled prior Tennessee cases and de-
clared it error to charge that the court is the judge of the law. It
explained that the jury should be instructed: "The jury are the
judges of the facts, and the law as it applies to the facts. In making
up their verdict they are to consider the law in connection with the
facts, but the court is the proper source from which they are to get
the law. In other words, they are the judges of the law as well as the
106. State ex rel. Melton v. Bomar, 300 S.W.2d 875 (Tenn. 1957).
107. Huffman v. State, 292 S.W.2d 738 (Tenn. 1956).
108. 296 S.W.2d 861 (Tenn. 1956).
109. 101 Tenn. 454, 47 S.W. 703 (1898).
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facts, under the direction of the court." 10 Does the second half of the
first sentence of this quotation mean anything more than that the
jury is to determine the application of the law to the facts, or does
it mean that they are to determine the applicability of the law which
comes from the court as the proper source of the law? In some states,
as in Maryland, counsel may argue to the jury that the statement of
the law by the court is erroneous and ask them to accept counsel's
version. Certainly the Ford opinion would not tolerate this, and the
opinion in the instant case accepts an anonymous commentator's con-
clusion that the primary object was not to invest the jury with the
power of the court but rather to prevent the court from invading
the province of the jury. Now, it is too clear for argument that at
common law, though the jury has always had the power to disregard
the instruction of the court notwithstanding that in doing so they
violate their oaths to render a true verdict according to the evidence
and the law as given them by the court, this does not mean that such
a violation is judicially approved. Still, if the Ford opinion is to be
taken as including in the jury's proper function the determination of
the applicability of the law, what does the second half of the second
sentence mean? Can it mean anything except that they are to get
the law from the court-where else can they get it?-and if the court
is the source of the law which they are to apply, is it not strictly
accurate to tell them that they are to take the law from the court?
The opinion in Ford in a part not quoted in the instant case does say
that the jurors should take the law as far as given them by the judge
and not set up their own assumed knowledge, but it adds that they
should not be limited to it if there is other law not contradictory.
Where, it may be asked, can they get the other law, and if such other
law exists, is it not the duty of defendant's counsel to call it to the
attention of the judge, so that he, as the source of the law, may give
it to the jury? In short, was the instruction in the instant case errone-
ous in the absence of any showing or contention that there was appli-
cable law other than that given in the charge? The decision in this
Dykes case should be widely publicized in order that trial judges may
not inadvertently violate its mandate and prosecutors may be on
guard.
Same-In Disbarment Proceedings: A disbarment proceeding is
sui generis and not a civil action or a criminal prosecution. The de-
fendant has no right to trial by jury on demand therefor, even if the
misconduct charged constitutes a crime.'
Challenges to Jurors-For Cause: At common law, challenges to
110. 47 S.W. at 705.
111. Memphis & Shelby County Bar Ass'n v. Vick, 290 S.W.2d 871 (Tenn.
App. W.S. 1955).
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jurors for cause had to do with ineligibility of the prospective juror
because of incapacity or lack of qualification to sit on any jury, prin-
cipal challenge which included relationship to a party within a
prohibited degree, and challenge to the favor. In modern terminology
the principal challenge is said to be for implied bias, to the favor for
actual bias. Where the practice, as in Tennessee, permits prospective
jurors to be questioned on voir dire, failure to inquire as to the exist-
ence of grounds for challenge is ordinarily held to be a waiver of the
right to challenge for an undiscovered disqualification. Thus, in
Farmer v. State,112 a prosecution for homicide, the fact that a juror
was a brother-in-law of the sheriff was not available to defendant,
where no challenge was interposed, as a ground for invalidating the
verdict of guilty, even though the relationship was not known to the
defendant or his counsel. If it was a valid ground for challenge, the
objection came too late. When a pertinent question is put on voir dire
and the juror honestly gives an incorrect answer, the question seems
to be whether thus depriving the party of an opportunity to challenge
for cause or peremptorily is prejudicial. Thus where counsel asked
if any juror had been a defendant in a lawsuit and no juror responded,
so that counsel treated the silence as a negative answer, the fact was
that one juror was a member of a partnership that had been sued for
a cause arising out of partnership activities, but he interpreted the
question as not applying to such a situation. The trial judge deemed
this no ground for a new trial on a simple issue where the jury had
returned a verdict after five minutes deliberation. The court of ap-
peals reversed, but the Supreme Court held the trial court's error
to be harmless.
113
Same-Effect of Erroneous Ruling on Challenge for Cause: Two
defendants were on trial for malicious destruction of an employer's
property during a strike called by a union of which defendants were
members. The trial judge erroneously ruled that any person who
was a member of any union whatever was ineligible to sit as a juror
and thereby disqualified fourteen members of the panel. The Supreme
Court analyzed this ruling as merely the equivalent of sustaining
fourteen peremptories by the prosecution which had eleven per-
emptories unused, thus erroneously giving the prosecution three
unauthorized peremptories. It then applied a commonly accepted
principle that a defendant is not entitled to trial by any particular
juror or group of jurors, but only to a trial by twelve qualified jurors,
and that a judge's error in mistakenly excluding a qualified juror is
nonprejudicial.1 4 With due respect, it is submitted that this analysis
112. 296 S.W.2d 879 (Tenn. 1956).
113. Thomas v. Hodges, 299 S.W.2d I (Term. 1957).
114. Nelson v. State, 292 S.W.2d 727 (Tenn. 1956).
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is incorrect. What the judge did was not merely to grant an unau-
thorized peremptory challenge or mistakenly to exclude a juror for
actual bias, but to disqualify as jurors members of a large segment of
the community to which the defendants belonged. This is contrary
to the basic theory of our system that the jury should represent a
cross section of the community, in this instance, of the county in
which the offense was committed. The same reasoning would have
been applicable had the excess number been sufficient to form a
complete jury of members otherwise qualified.
Same-Number of Peremptories and Order of Exercise: In a civil
action each side, not each individual party, is entitled to only two
peremptory challenges, and the trial judge may require that the sec-
ond peremptory be exercised before the vacancy caused by the exer-
cise of the first has been filled. Such a ruling, if error, is harmless
error.115
Order of Proof and the Like: The order of proof in a legal action,
civil or criminal, is governed by the discretion of the judge; and it is no
abuse of his discretion to permit the prosecution to recall a witness in
rebuttal and to allow him to testify to a highly relevant matter which
should have been covered in the prosecution's main case but of which
the prosecution then had no knowledge. 16 Likewise, the order of
proceeding in chancery is in the discretion of the chancellor. He may
order a factual accounting before determining the applicable law; and
he may set aside a report made on an order of reference where it is
clear that special training, apparently not possessed by the master
first appointed, was required for a complete accounting of the com-
plex business in suit.11
7
Motions During Trial-Nonsuit, Dismissal, Directed Verdict-At
Law: At common law a case might be disposed of without trial by
nonsuit, discontinuance or retraxit. In Tennessee practice retraxit
does not exist. And the effect of a disposition of a case with or without
trial depends upon the reasons for which the disposition was made.
But a judge trying a case at law has no power to enter a judgment of
dismissal with prejudice, which will make the judgment entered
thereon operate as a conclusive disposition of the cause of action on
the merits."18 The Court of Appeals of the Western Section has fully
reconsidered the test for the direction of a verdict both in a wills con-
test and in an ordinary action, and has formulated it as follows:
From the whole of the relevant, material and substantial evidence intro-
duced by the party against whom the motion is made together with
115. Kunk v. Howell, 289 S.W.2d 874 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956).
116. Nichols v. State, 289 S.W.2d 849 (Tenn. 1956).
117. Kelso v. Kelso, 292 S.W.2d 483 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1955).
118. Long v. Kirby-Smith, 292 S.W.2d 216 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956).
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all other evidence in the case supporting the position of such party
and all legitimate inferences of fact favorable to him which may be
legally drawn from such evidence, disregarding all other countervail-
ing evidence, can the party against whom the motion is made succeed
under the proper charge of the Court?119
But it is to be remembered that where the testimony of a witness is
contrary to the physical facts established by the evidence and by
mathematical calculations and other judicially noticed matter, that
testimony must be disregarded; the credibility of the witness in this
respect is not a jury question.120
Same-Dismissal in Chancery: In a suit to set aside the foreclosure
of a deed of trust, the chancellor may in his discretion stop proceedings
and order the bill dismissed where he is convinced that the testimony
of the plaintiff and her supporting witnesses upon the crucial issue is
"wholly incredible." He is the sole judge of the credibility of the wit-
nesses, and in such a situation it would be futile to continue the trial
or hearing. 1
Charge to Jury-Request to Charge-When Necessary: Where the
general charge given in a civil case covered the general subject matter
involved but omitted all reference to a special defense pleaded, namely
that the fire in question started on premises leased by defendant to
plaintiff, there was no error in absence of a request by defendant,
particularly since defendant offered no evidence in support of this
defense. - Even in a criminal case where the judge charged fully
upon reasonable doubt, his omission to apply the rule as charged
to defendant's theory of defense "was nothing more than meagreness
in the charge" and was not error in the absence of a request by de-
fendant to supply the omission.12 But where there are several parties
defendant in a civil action and a special request by one of them
covers a matter common to himself and the others, no request by the
others is necessary. The purpose of requiring a request is to bring
the matter requested to the attention of the judge. Yet if a portion of
the charge is inaccurate as to a single defendant only, he must request
correction or clarification.m
Same-Effect of Denial: The Tennessee Court of Appeals is con-
stantly called upon to remind counsel that failure or refusal to charge
as specially requested is not erroneous when the matter requested is
fairly covered in the general charge.12 The same is true where the
119. Jones v. Sands, 292 S.W.2d 492, 498 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1953); Callahan
v. Town of Middleton, 292 S.W.2d 501, 510 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1954).
120. Gordon's Transports v. Bailey, 294 S.W.2d 313 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956).
121. Allen v. Goldstein, 291 S.W.2d 596 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956).
122. Illinois Central R.R. v. Exum, 296 S.W.2d 372 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1955).
123. Rosenthal v. State, 292 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1956).
124. Womac v. Casteel, 292 S.W.2d 782 (Tenn. 1956).
125. McAmis v. Carlisle, 300 S.W.2d 59 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956); Funk v.
We]don, 292 S.W.2d 207 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1953).
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requested charge is not applicable to the evidence received or is
incomplete or otherwise inaccurate. 26
Same-Form in Felony Cases: In a prosecution for felony the trial
judge's charge is required to be in writing and "no part of it shall be
delivered orally." But the Supreme Court has held that the harmless
error statute is applicable if it affirmatively appears that the failure to
comply with the requirement is harmless. In Black v. State127 the
jury, being in doubt as to whether accused was guilty of second degree
murder or of voluntary manslaughter, returned and asked for further
instructions defining "malice" as an ingredient of second degree mur-
der. The doubting jurors, "just a short while" after receiving an
oral charge in compliance with the request, agreed to the verdict of
murder in the second degree. Consequently, it affirmatively appeared
that the oral instruction did influence the verdict to the prejudice of
defendant, and the conviction was reversed and a new trial granted.
Same-When Erroneous Charge Harmless: The trial judge errone-
ously charged that the law presumes statements made by the accused
against himself are true, while those made in his own behalf may be
considered as true or false as the jurors see fit. The error was held to
be harmless, in the absence of a contrary showing, because there was
in the evidence no statement of the accused against himself.128 The
wonder grows that any Tennessee trial judge should assume the
existence of such a presumption, particularly in a criminal case.
Same-Defining the Issues: When the trial judge correctly charged
that the proved condition of a public street of a city did not con-
stitute a nuisance per se, his charge to the jury permitting recovery
against the city either on the theory of nuisance in fact or a dangerous
condition caused by the negligence of the city was proper. The court
may properly submit issues raised by each of several counts based
on different theories or specifications alleged therein for the same
wrong where they are not inconsistent in fact. Thus it may properly
submit to the jury plaintiff's claims (1) that the injury in question
was caused by defendant's violation of the statute regulating the driv-
ing of a motor vehicle on the public highways, and (2) that it was
caused by his conduct constituting common law negligence.
129
Same-Recalling the Jury for Additional Instructions: The court
may, on its own motion or on suggestion of a party, recall the jury
and make such corrections of the charge previously given as he deems
necessary, even to the extent of instructing them to disregard entirely
the original charge and substituting a new charge therefor.
130
126. Hammonds v. Mansfield, 296 S.W.2d 652 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1955).
127. 296 S.W.2d 833 (Tenn. 1956).
128. Rosenthal v. State, 292 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1956).
129. Ross v. Griggs, 296 S.W.2d 641 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1955).
130. McAmis v. Carlisle, 300 S.W.2d 59 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956).
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Verdict-Court's Refusal to Accept Improper Verdict: The jury
returned a verdict that accused was guilty of three offenses; namely,
receiving, transporting and possessing intoxicating liquors. The evi-
dence showed that all three occurred in a single transaction. The
trial judge refused to receive the verdict and over accused's objection
sent the jury back with instructions to confine their verdict to one of
the three. The jury then returned a verdict of guilty of transporting.
It was held that the action of the trial judge was correct.131 This ruling
is no doubt in accord with common law practice. The judge may for
good cause require a jury to reconsider its verdict in the light of
further instructions.
Same-General Verdict-Special Interrogatories: It is recognized
procedure in Tennessee to have the jury return a general verdict to-
gether with answers to special interrogatories. If these answers do not
warrant a judgment, then judgment is to be entered on the general
verdict. A special finding accompanying a general verdict as an answer
to interrogatories may be properly set aside by the judge if it is vague
and not responsive to the questions submitted.1 2
Motions After Trial-Motion in Arrest of Judgment-Waiver: A
motion in arrest of judgment, other than for a defect in the verdict,
goes to the foundation of the plaintiff's claim and assumes that the
trial was regular and that the verdict is warranted by the evidence.
Hence such a motion is inconsistent with a motion for a new trial,
and filing the former motion after or contemporaneously with a
motion for a new trial is a waiver of the motion in arrest. 133
NEW TRIAL
Misconduct of Counsel: Counsel for the State was guilty of serious
misconduct in charging a "frame-up" between defendant's counsel and
a witness, but the trial judge did not err in refusing to grant a
mistrial, for he immediately excluded the jury, reprimanded counsel
and, after questioning a number of jurors, concluded that no juryman
had heard the objectionable statement.
134
Misconduct of Juror: Though a juror should base his verdict upon
a consideration of the evidence and the instructions of the court, still
the court will not consider any testimony by him that he agreed to
the verdict because he was ill and wanted to go home or that he did
not really agree but left the decision to God and the other eleven
jurors. Testimony of the mental operations by which he arrived at
the verdict and the considerations which induced him to'agree is
131. McBride v. State, 290 S.W.2d 648 (Tenn. 1956).
132. Lenoir Car Works v. Littleton, 293 S.W.2d 585 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956).
133. Wakefield v. Baxter, 297 S.W.2d 97 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956).
134. Rosenthal v. State, 292 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1956).
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inadmissible in impeachment of the verdict. But the repetition by a
juryman in the jury room of a conversation overheard by him between
two expert witnesses unfavorable to appellant's claim is misconduct
for which a new trial must be granted upon an affirmative showing
that the misconduct influenced the verdict; in the absence of such
a showing, the trial judge's refusal to grant a new trial is not rever-
sible error. 35 The court heard testimony of the jurors to the effect
that none of them was influenced by this misconduct. In considering
the testimony and relying upon the harmless error statute, the court
relied upon the opinion of the late Judge Anderson in Meegal v. Mem-
phis St. Ry. 36 He in turn had relied on the decision in Thomason v.
Trentham 37 in which the Supreme Court applied the statute to mis-
conduct of jurors in the jury room in discussing matter which might
well have been prejudicial and in which the jurors had testified that
they were not influenced by the objectionable matter. That decision
made the earlier precedents to the contrary no longer applicable. A
fortiori, the trial judge was held to be justified in denying a motion
for a new trial based on the affidavit of one juror that another of the
jurors whom he could not identify by name or otherwise said that he
would try to lean over backwards in the case because of his prejudice
against Jews. 38 The record showed that each juror on voir dire swore
that he had no prejudice against Jews. Defendant was a Jew.
Newly Discovered Evidence-Required Showing: The rule is well
settled that the party seeking a new trial on the ground of newly dis-
covered evidence must show that he used due diligence to discover it
and have it available at the trial; and where the evidence which he
presents is such as to justify a finding of lack of such diligence, a denial
of a new trial will not be disturbed on appeal.139 And the same is
true where it does not appear that the newly discovered evidence
would be likely to affect the result. Where there was conflicting evi-
dence at the trial and the moving party was aware of the presence of
the witness at the scene and did not inform his counsel, a new trial
was properly denied.140
Same-Impeaching Testimony: The ruling of the trial judge denying
a new trial will be approved where (1) the facts tend to show lack
of diligence, (2) the evidence is of prior inconsistent statements of a
witness who, the defendant asserts, was thoroughly discredited at
the trial so that the new evidence is cumulative and (3) the new evi-
135. McKamey v. Andrews, 289 S.W.2d 704, 709, 710 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1955).
136. 34 Tenn. App. 403, 238 S.W.2d 519 (W.S. 1950).
137. 178 Tenn. 37, 154 S.W.2d 792 (1941).
138. Rosenthal v. State, 292 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1956).
139. Illinois Central R.R. v. Exum, 296 S.W.2d 372 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1955).
140. Spence v. Came, 292 S.W.2d 438 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1954).
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dence is not likely to effect a result more favorable to the moving
party.'
4 '
Same-Form and Validity of Ruling On: It is the duty of a trial
judge to set aside a verdict if he is not satisfied with it, and his ruling
ordering the new trial without stating the reasons therefor is not
subject to review.1' In denying a new trial, the judge need not state
whether or not he applied the thirteenth juror rule. In the absence
of any statement with reference to that rule, it will be assumed that
he approved the verdict.14
3
Same-Thirteenth Juror Rule-Limitation: The thirteenth juror
rule requires that if the trial judge is dissatisfied with the verdict, so
that had he been a juror he would not have agreed with the other
jurors in returning it, he must set the verdict aside and grant a new
trial. It does not empower him to reduce a verdict of guilty of murder
in the first degree to a verdict of guilty of a lesser included offense;
and if his ruling purports to do so, it will be reversed on appeal and
a new trial will be ordered. 4
4
JUDGMENTS
Effect of Judgment as Res Adjudicata or Collateral Estoppel-Judg-
ment Other Than on Merits: A judgment of dismissal of an action at
law "with full prejudice" is not a judgment on the merits, for no such
judgment is recognized in Tennessee practice. It is the equivalent of
a judgment of nonsuit and the cause of action is not merged in the
judgment. Such is the effect of the decision in Wyatt v. Lassiter.14
By analogy, in a criminal case where a defendant was charged with
stealing brass rollers and the indictment was quashed at the trial
because the evidence showed a stealing of bronze rollers, the decision
did not bar a subsequent prosecution for stealing the bronze rollers.146
Same-Effect Upon Finding or Decision on Merits: Bills and motions
by defendant in a divorce action to have a decree for separate main-
tenance and support of plaintiff changed to a decree for absolute
divorce were denied and no appeal from the orders and decrees of
denial was taken. These decrees operated as a complete bar to a later
bill by defendant to have the decree for separate maintenance replaced
by a decree for absolute divorce, and there is no public policy that
requires plaintiff to seek or accept an absolute divorce.147
141. Rosenthal v. State, 292 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1956). See also Bradshaw v.
Holt, 292 S.W.2d 30 (Tenn. 1956).
142. Wakefield v. Baxter, 297 S.W.2d 97 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956).
143. Gordon's Transports v. Bailey, 294 S.W.2d 313 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956).
144. State v. Odom, 292 S.W.2d 23 (Tenn. 1956).
145. 299 S.W.2d 229 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956).
146. Wilson v. State, 292 S.W.2d 188 (Tenn. 1956).
147. Perrin v. Perrin, 299 S.W.2d 19 (Tenn. 1957).
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Same-Collateral Estoppel in Tax Cases: In an action by the State
against a defendant who was performing a contract with the United
States government a finding that, for the purpose of determining its
liability to pay sales taxes, it was an independent contractor and not
an agent of the United States, does not operate to prevent the contrac-
tor from asserting that it was to be treated as an agent of the United
States in a later action in which the issue was its liability to pay
privilege taxes. The court declared that in tax cases the doctrine of
collateral estoppel cannot be applied "unless the identical taxes are
involved in the second or later suit."'
1 48
Direct or Collateral Attack: A judgment of a court of general juris-
diction which appears on the face of the record to be void is subject
to collateral attack. Hence a consent decree entered on a stipulation
that is void as against public policy is a nullity and may be stricken
on motion.149 But a judgment of such a court which does not appear
on its face to be void is subject only to a direct attack. And this rule
is applicable to a judgment of conviction in the Criminal Court of
Davidson County, so that in a habeas corpus proceeding the convicted
defendant cannot raise the question of lack of jurisdiction of the
subject matter on the ground that accused was under eighteen years
of age and the offense for that reason was within the exclusive juris-
diction of the juvenile court.
150
APPEAL AND ERROR
Generally: The Tennessee courts are alert to protect the rights of
a defeated litigant to have his case reviewed where he has been
prevented from complying with the technical requirements without
fault of any kind on his part. In Uselton v. Price,151 Judge Shriver,
speaking for the court, approved and applied an early opinion by Mr.
Justice Carruthers specifying the conditions under which certiorari
may properly be used as a substitute for an appeal. The petitioner for
the writ must show that his appeal was prevented or defeated:
1. By the oppressive or erroneous act of the court or justice.
2. By the wilful or negligent act of the clerk.
3. By the contrivance or procurement of the adverse party.
4. By inevitable accident.
5. By the blameless misfortune of the petitioner.152
148. Roane-Anderson Co. v. Evans, 292 S.W.2d 398, 402 (Tenn. 1956).
149. Lane v. Sumner County, 298 S.W.2d 708 (Tenn. 1957).
150. ;Bomar v. State ex rel. Stewart, 300 S.W.2d 885 (Tenn. 1957); discussed
in Earle, Criminal Law and Procedure-1957 Tennessee Survey, 10 VAND. L.
REv. 1073, 1078-79 (1957).
151. 292 S.W.2d 788 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956).
152. Id. at 793.
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The issue of such a writ by the circuit court to a justice of the peace
was proper in a case in which failure of an appeal bond to reach the
justice on time was due to an unusual delay in the mails.
On the other hand, the courts regularly resort to the doctrine of
harmless error where the record does not indicate to their satisfaction
that errors committed by the trial court resulted in prejudice to the
appellant. In some instances the record may affirmatively show lack
of prejudice, as where objectionable evidence is received upon a
matter as to which there was no substantial dispute153 or where the
trial judge's refusal to grant an appeal was followed by a writ of
error in hearing which all pertinent objections were heard and deci-
sion was rendered on the merits. 54 But in other situations much may
be said in support of the contention that the court brushes aside
errors that in the opinion of the bar are regarded as affecting such
substantial rights as trial by jury in criminal prosecutions. Thus in
Nelson v. State5 5 the court held to be harmless error first a ruling
which counsel may well have reasonably interpreted as preventing
his introducing to the jury upon the issue of the worth of an admitted
confession testimony tending to show that it was obtained by force,
threats or other wrongful inducement, and secondly another erroneous
ruling disqualifying all members of any labor union, where the panel
contained fourteeen such jurors. The court found the evidence of
guilt strong and felt that the statute requiring disregard of harmless
error required affirmance. It analyzed the ruling as to ineligibility as
resulting only in allowing the state three unauthorized challenges and
not to be in violation of defendant's constitutional right to an im-
partial jury. At present the court regards the harmless error statute
as inapplicable to any ruling which invades a constitutional right of
a defendant. 5
6
Who May Appeal-Error Not Prejudicial to Appellant: In an action
for a mandatory injunction to compel interstate carriers to interline
freight in which a union and some of its members engaged in a
labor dispute with plaintiff were made defendants, the union pleaded
that the court had no jurisdiction of the cause and prayed that it be
dismissed. The court ordered the union dismissed but entered a de-
cree against the carriers. The carriers did not appeal; the union in
its appeal did not assign any error in the order dismissing it. The
plaintiff's motion that the appeal be dismissed was granted on the
ground that the union, none of whose members was employed by
plaintiff, had no standing to appeal.157 Parties plaintiff in an action
153. Illinois Central R.R. v. Exum, 296 S.W.2d 372 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1955).
154. Agricultural Ins. Co. v. Holter, 299 S.W.2d 15 (Tenn. 1957).
155. 292 S.W.2d 727 (Tenn. 1956).
156. Dykes v. State, 296 S.W.2d 861 (Tenn. 1956).




who were not parties to a cross-bill by one defendant against a third
party defendant cannot complain of a decree in favor of that defendant
against the cross-complainant. 158 In like manner, where a bank inter-
pleaded a claimant, a daughter of the depositor to whom a certificate
of deposit was "payable on her (depositor's) death," and all the
other next of kin of the depositor and the chancellor decreed that the
payment be made to the daughter "subject to the just debts" of the
depositor, the court on appeal held that the certificate constituted a
contract between the bank and the depositor for the benefit of the
daughter, and that the decree in no way aggrieved the other next of
kin. The daughter might have appealed from the portion of the decree
making the award subject to the debts, but the other next of kin were
in no way harmed and had no standing to appeal.15 9
Same-State in Criminal Case: The state is entitled to certiorari to
review the judgment of conviction of defendant of murder in the
second degree entered pursuant to order of the trial court on motion
of defendant for a new trial after the jury had returned a verdict of
guilty of murder of the first degree. A judge has no power to modify
the jury's verdict, though he may set it aside and grant a new trial. 100
Same-From Decision of County Court as Administrative Tribunal:
A person who was not a party before the county court in a proceeding
to establish as a utility district an area in which he was a resident is
not a party aggrieved by the decision so as to be entitled to appeal to
the circuit court. In such a proceeding the county court functions as
an administrative rather than a judicial tribunal.'61
What is Appealable-Finality of Decision: Where a demurrer was
sustained to a bill of complaint interposed by fewer than all defend-
ants and the bill dismissed as to them, but the action remains pending
as to the other defendants, no appeal lies by plaintiff; and an appeal
taken by him will be dismissed.162 In a similar situation a discretionary
appeal from an order overruling a demurrer as to certain specifications
of negligence will be dismissed, leaving the case for trial on other
issues. In an action at law there is no provision for a discretionary
appeal.163 But in an equitable proceeding the trial court may authorize
a discretionary appeal, and the proceeding in the nature of quo war-
ranto authorized by sections 6-301 to 6-319 of the Tennessee Code is
an equitable proceeding. 164
158. Lowe v. Wright, 292 S.W.2d 413 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956).
159. Peoples Bank v. Baxter, 298 S.W.2d 732 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956).
160. State v. Odom, 292 S.W.2d 23 (Tenn. 1956).
161. Griffitts v. Rockford Utility District, 298 S.W.2d 33 (Tenn. App. E.S.
1956).
162. Murphey v. Brewer, 296 S.W.2d 884 (Tenn. 1956).
163. City of Memphis v. Birkner, 292 S.W.2d 195 (Tenn. 1956).
164. State ex rel. Southerland v. Town of Greenville, 297 S.W.2d 68 (Tenn.
1956).
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In Hickle v. Irick'65 the effect of the death of the trial judge after
orally announcing his order overruling plaintiff's motion for a new
trial and before the order was entered upon the minutes was the key
to the decision. The entry was made as of the date of the oral an-
nouncement by the clerk at the succeeding term of court by copying
a form of order approved by the attorneys of both parties immediately
after the hearing. Thereafter plaintiff moved for a new trial before
a judge who had been recently appointed and who ruled that the
original order had become effective as of the date of its rendition. On
appeal it was held that (1) the oral decision was without legal effect,
(2) the clerk's action was beyond his power and the entry upon the
minutes was without legal significance, (3) the judgment first became
appealable after the entry of the later order denying plaintiff's mo-
tion and (4) that order was erroneous. The case was remanded with
instructions that it be restored "to the docket for trial as upon con-
tinuance."'66 This was a logical result and afforded the plaintiff an
adequate legal remedy, so that there was no occasion for him to resort
to equity for relief.
To What Court: From a decree finding defendant guilty of and im-
posing punishment for contempt in violating an injunction against
acts contrary to a zoning ordinance 167 or an injunction against mass
picketing168 an appeal lies directly to the Supreme Court for the pro-
ceedings are criminal in nature. It follows that on appeal on the
ground of insufficiency of the evidence, the judgment will be affirmed
unless the court is convinced that the evidence preponderates against
the finding of guilt. The same rule applies where the appeal is to the
court of appeals.169
A suit by private individuals in the nature of quo warranto, 7 0 to
prevent annexation of territory to a municipality is an equitable pro-
ceeding, and a discretionary appeal to the Supreme Court is therefore
proper.'7'
Effect of Appeal upon Jurisdiction: In the Hickle case the well
settled rule is assumed that the filing of a motion for a new trial or
a rehearing within the prescribed time suspends all proceedings upon
the judgment until the motion is disposed of. But the case does not
touch the question of the effect of a perfected appeal upon the power
of the trial court to entertain a motion for a new trial or rehearing
165. 300 S.W.2d 54 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956).
166. Id. at 59.
167. Davidson County v. Randall, 300 S.W.2d 618 (Tenn. 1957).
168. Gunn v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 296 S.W.2d 843 (Tenn. 1956).
169. Aladdin Industries v. Associated Transport, 298 S.W.2d 770, 785 (Tenn.
App. M.S. 1956).
170. TENN. CODE ANN. H 6-301to 6-319 (1956, Supp. 1957).




made thereafter and before the end of the period in which such a
motion may normally be made. That question was answered in John-
son v. Johnson.7 2 After an appeal from a decree of the chancellor in
favor of defendants, complainants filed a petition to rehear which the
chancellor entertained. Over objection of defendants he ordered a
rehearing. Defendants petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of
certiorari. After thorough consideration of the authorities, the court
held that upon the perfection of an appeal the case is transferred to
the appellate court but with the reservation of the power in the
trial court to recall the appeal at any time within the statutory
period in which a party may move for a new trial or rehearing. The
trial court does not lose jurisdiction within that period.
Prerequisites: The courts have been uniformly strict in requiring
compliance with the statutory requisites as to leave to appeal, time
for filing a bill of exceptions, the necessity for such a bill and its
authentication, the necessity for a previous motion for a new trial and
the like, as previous annual surveys have noted. Recent examples are
found in Duboise v. State,7 3 in which it has held that an order extend-
ing the time for filing the bill of exceptions made after the expiration
of the prescribed thirty-day period was a nullity, and in Parrish v.
Yeiser,7 4 in which the same rule was recognized but in which it was
also held that when the order for extension was made within the
prescribed period failure to enter it upon the minutes for five days
was a mere irregularity which did not vitiate the order.
Recent statutes must be consulted, for some of them have made
former rulings inapplicable. For example, section 27-303 of the Ten-
nessee Code provides that cases tried in a court of record without a
jury are reviewable upon a simple appeal "and no motion for a new
trial shall be necessary." But its application is still subject to inter-
pretation. In Adams v. Patterson1 5 the Supreme Court held that it
did not change the former rule in workmen's compensation cases.
In such cases the appeal is still an appeal in the nature of a writ of
error in a civil case; the later enacted statute embodied in section
27-303 of the Tennessee Code has no application. Where a motion for
a new trial is granted in a case tried by jury and exception is taken
thereto and preserved in a wayside bill of exceptions and a verdict and
judgment are entered on the second trial, the plaintiff need not move
for a new trial as a condition of having the ruling reviewed. If at
the second trial the plaintiff again recovers and defendant, on his
motion for a new trial, is granted judgment on the ground that the
172. 292 S.W.2d 472 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956).
173. 290 S.W.2d 646 (Tenn. 1956).
174. 298 S.W.2d 556 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956).
175. 301 S.W.2d 362 (Tenn. 1957).
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judge should have directed a verdict for him, the plaintiff as a pre-
requisite to appeal must move for a new trial. In the decision the
court follows precedents old and new, which it considers mistaken;
it regrets doing so, for its opinion clearly indicates disapproval of
the action of the trial judge.17 6
Scope of Review-Writ of Error, Appeal in the Nature of: The court
of appeals has no power to review the evidence and determine a mere
preponderance of the evidence or the credibilty of the testimony on
which a verdict is based. 177 Nor does it have power to reverse a
judgment because it believes the damages awarded are inadequate
or excessive in the absence of a showing that the excess or inadequacy
is due to fraud or is so great as to evince passion, prejudice or un-
accountable caprice.17 8 Where the trial judge requires a remittitur as
a condition of refusing a new trial and the court of appeals affirms,
in practice the Supreme Court treats the concurrent finding as well
nigh conclusive; but where plaintiff accepts the remittitur under
protest and the court of appeals affirms, the ruling may, under section
27-119 of the Tennessee Code, be reviewed by the Supreme Court for
the sole purpose of determining whether or not the verdict should
have been reduced. The court may either affirm the judgment for
the reduced amount or render judgment for the full amount of the
verdict; it has no power to order a further reduction.17 9 Furthermore,
the findings of the trial judge on the motion for a new trial have the
same effect on review as does a verdict of a jury.180 But where there
is no conflict in the evidence as to any material fact, the question
presented is one of law; and there is no necessity of determining the
extent of the court's authority to consider the issue de novo on the
evidence. 181
Same-Same-From County Court to Circuit Court: The appeal
from the county court to the circuit court in a proceeding to establish
a utility district is inther nature of a writ of error. Consequently,
when a bill of exceptions would be necessary in an appeal from the
circuit court to the court of appeals, it is equally necessary in such an
appeal from the county court to the circuit court.'82
Same-Appeal from Chancery Court: On a broad appeal from a de-
cree in chancery the case is reviewable de novo on the law and the
176. Howell v. Wallace E. Johnson, Inc., 298 S.W.2d 753 (Tenn. App. W.S.
1956).
177. McAmis v. Carlisle, 300 S.W.2d 59 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956).
178. Ibid.; Hammonds v. Mansfield, 296 S.W.2d 652 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1955).
179. Lambert Brothers v. Larkins, 296 S.W.2d 353 (Tenn. 1956).
180. Rosenthal v. State, 292 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1956).
181. Robinson v. Kemmons Wilson Realty Co., 293 S.W.2d 574 (Tenn. App.
W.S. 1956).




facts. 8 3 Thus, where the chancellor found that the two cross-defend-
ants in a suit to set aside the foreclosure of a deed of trust had conspired
to deprive the complainant of her equity in her home and prevent her
from refinancing it, the court of appeals reviewed the evidence and
found (1) no conspiracy and (2) a breach of trust by each defendant;
it therefore entered a decree, modifying the chancellor's decree, based
on the theory that one of the defendants was primarily liable and
the other secondarily liable for a sum found to be the value of the
equity.84 And on appeal of a wife from a decree dismissing her cross-
complaint for separate maintenance after the court had dismissed
the husband's bill for divorce because of his lack of residence for the
required period, the court reviewed all the evidence, including that
offered on the husband's bill, in considering whether her conduct had
been such as to deprive her of the right to support. It held that the
preponderance of the evidence showed the wife guilty of cruel and
inhuman treatment which would have entitled the husband to a
divorce had it not been for his failure to meet the residence require-
ment.185 But where a matter has been properly referred to a master
and he has made findings of fact in which the chancellor concurs,
the finding is not subject to review by the court of appeals.18
It is also true that where the chancellor and court of appeals agree
as to the facts, their finding is conclusive upon certiorari to the
Supreme Court as was true, for example, with the finding that a
deed by husband and wife to a stranger and his reconveyance to them
were intended to create a tenancy by the entirety. 87 But where
relevant evidence of the damages caused plaintiff by breach of con-
tract has been erroneously excluded, the fact that the master, the
chancellor and the court of appeals all agreed does not preclude the
Supreme Court upon the issue, for this rule has no application to
findings "upon a non-determinative point" or to a finding which has
no evidence to support it.1m Where the chancellor and the court of
appeals are in sharp disagreement in their findings of fact, the Supreme
Court on certiorari examines the evidence de novo. In so doing it
begins with a "presumption" in favor of the chancellor's finding which
is overcome only when the preponderance is against his finding.18
Same-Bill of Review: In the case of a bill of review for errors on
183. Real Estate Management v. Giles, 293 S.W.2d 596 (Tenn. App. E.S.
1956); Stonecipher v. Knoxville Say. & Loan Ass'n, 298 S.W.2d 785 (Tenn.
App. E.S. 1956) (an appeal from judgment of circuit court affirming judgment
of general session).
184. Jones v. Thomas, 296 S.W.2d 646 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1955).
185. Elrod v. Elrod, 296 S.W.2d 849 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956).
186. Kelso v. Kelso, 292 S.W.2d 483 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1955); TENN. CoDE
ANN. § 27-113 (1956).
187. Moore v. Cole, 289 S.W.2d 695 (Tenn. 1956).
188. Jennings v. Lamb, 296 S.W.2d 828 (Tenn. 1956).
189. Barnett v. Thirkifeld, 300 S.W.2d 905 (Tenn. 1957).
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the face of the record the court examines only the pleadings and the
decree for the errors alleged in the bill and cannot examine the evi-
dence to determine whether the statement of facts in the decree was
erroneous. 190
Record on Appeal-Requisites-Technical Record: The statute which
requires that the minutes be signed by the judge each day is directory
rather than mandatory, and the failure of the judge to sign for the
day on which the order convicting defendant was entered does not
invalidate the judgment of conviction.191
Same-Same-Bill of Exceptions: The bill of exceptions must be
authenticated by the signature of the judge; but where the record as
originally transmitted to the court of appeals mistakenly included
not the original but an unsigned copy, the record may be corrected.
Where necessary the court may in such a situation grant a rehearing,
though petition therefor is filed late, if the original opinion was based
on the failure of the record to include an authenticated bil1.1
92
Same-Exceptions-Evidence: Before the enactment of chapter 236,
Public Acts of 1955,193 error in rulings on evidence could not be con-
sidered unless the record showed that exceptions had been taken at
the trial.19 But it is now sufficient that the objection was timely and
specific "and, when appropriate, where such error was called to the
attention of the trial court by inclusion as a ground of the motion for
a new trial."'195 But where the defendant did not object to certain
evidence, preserved no exception to it and did not make its reception
a ground of his motion for a new trial, the error, if any, may not be
considered on appeal.1 And an alleged error denying requests for
special instructions is not available to appellant if the requested in-
structions are not included in the bill of exceptions, for they are not
part of the technical record. 197 Likewise, no consideration can be
given to an assignment of error that there was no evidence to sustain
the judgment where the evidence was not preserved in the bill of ex-
ceptions.19
Same-Assignment of Error: An assignment of error, based on the
contention that the judgment and decree are contrary to the law and
the evidence, will be disregarded unless it specifies the particulars
indicating the alleged inconsistency.1' And the court will not consider
190. Orrick v. Orrick, 296 S.W.2d 825 (Tenn. 1956).
191. Duboise v. State, 290 S.W.2d 646 (Tenn. 1956).
192. McAmis v. Carlisle, 300 S.W.2d 59 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956).
193. TENx. CODE ANN. § 27-311 (Supp. 1957).
194. McKamey v. Andrews, 289 S.W.2d 704 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1955).
195. TENN. CODE ANx. § 27-311 (Supp. 1957).
196. Rosenthal v. State, 292 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1956).
197. Gordon's Transports v. Bailey, 294 S.W.2d 313 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956).




-a contention that a so-called special verdict (a narrative answering
:special questions) is inconsistent with the general verdict where the
trial judge had ordered the special verdict set aside and the appellant
did not assign the ruling as error.200
Dismissal of Appeal-Case Moot: Where the trial judge sustained
defendant's demurrer in a quo warranto proceeding and defendant
thereafter resigned from the office the usurpation of which was
alleged by relators, the issue of usurpation became moot; and the
Supreme Court refused to retain jurisdiction merely to determine the
issue of taxation of costs.2 01 The court relied upon State ex rel. Wilson
v. Bush,20 2 in which the court carefully and fully examined the au-
thorities and distinguished those holding otherwise as depending
upon statutes giving the prevailing party an absolute right to costs,
whereas in Tennessee taxation of costs is within the discretion of the
trial judge under the statute which is now embodied in section 20-1621
of the Tennessee Code.
DECISIONS OF FEDERAL COURTS
The following decisions of the United States Court of Appeals,
Sixth Circuit, and of the United States District Courts in Tennessee
are of interest to Tennessee lawyers.
Court of Appeals
Remedies-Habeas Corpus-Right to be Heard: Where an appellate
court has determined that a petition for habeas corpus contains such
grave charges that petitioner is entitled to be heard, he is entitled to
be present in person at the hearing, and denial of his request to be
present is reversible error.
20 3
Jurisdiction-Subject Matter: Jurisdiction over subject matter may
be raised at any time while the cause is properly before the court at
any stage. Therefore, the defendant United States can raise the
question for the first time before the court of appeals. A court has
no jurisdiction in a civil action against the United States except in
cases where the United States has consented to be sued. It has
not so consented to actions for torts committed by its servant while
not acting within the scope of his employment.
20 4
A three-judge court has no jurisdiction of a proceeding to restrain
the refusal of a board of education to admit Negro students. The
question has been so firmly answered by the United States Supreme
200. Lenoir Car Works v. Littleton, 293 S.W.2d 585, 588 (Tenn. App. E.S.
1956).
201. State v. Stine, 292 S.W.2d 771 (Tenn. 1956).
202. 141 Tenn. 229, 208 S.W. 607 (1918).
203. Kay v. United States, 233 F.2d 442 (6th Cir. 1956).
204. United States v. Taylor, 236 F.2d 649 (6th Cir. 1956).
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Court that such a proceeding no longer involves a substantial federal
constitutional question.
20 5
Judicial Notice-Records in Same Cause: Upon the issue of whether
the action has been brought within the period prescribed by the appli-
cable state statute of limitations, the trial judge hearing the case
without a jury may properly notice judicially the pleadings, requests
for admissions and answers thereto in the pending action which show
that plaintiff took a voluntary nonsuit for the same cause in a state
court and instituted this action seasonably. The court of appeals
suggests, however, a doubt as to the propriety of taking notice of these
matters in a trial by jury.20
6
Evidence-Relevance-Hearsay: Hearsay evidence received without
objection may properly be considered by the jury and will not be
disregarded by the court in determining the weight to be given to the
testimony on the issue of whether a verdict should have been directed
for defendant.
207
Opinion-Expert and Lay: The trial judge properly refused to receive
testimony of a police captain that the effect of a sudden stop of a
vehicle would cause the occupants to be thrown forward. The cap-
tain was not an expert in this subject, and it would seem pretty clear
that any layman could form an equally reliable opinion and apply it
to the facts where the defendant's claim was the plaintiff's car stopped
so suddenly that he could not avoid striking it from the rear.
20 8
Same-Expert Opinion on Ultimate Issue: The opinion of a qualified
physician who was a medical examiner for several insurance com-
panies that assured was insurable at the time of his examination was
held admissible.
2 09
Evidence-Parol Evidence Rule-Interpretation: Where a mutual
life insurance policy, which is not subject to a contrary statutory pro-
vision, stipulates that "this policy ... embodies all agreements existing
between himself and the company or any of its agents relating to this
insurance," evidence of nonfraudulent statements of fact in the appli-
cation for the insurance cannot be considered, so that such statements,
even though false, are immaterial upon the issue of the validity of the
policy.
210
Witnesses-Examinations-Use of Charts and Diagrams: The trial
judge may properly permit a witness to use charts and diagrams in
explanation of his testimony concerning the matters which they illus-
205. Booker v. Tennessee Board of Education, 240 F.2d 689 (6th Cir. 1957).
206. McLellan Stores Co. v. Weaver, 238 F.2d 232 (6th Cir. 1956).
207. Byars v. United States, 238 F.2d 82 (6th Cir. 1956).
208. Floyd v. Fedun, 237 F.2d 647 (6th Cir. 1956).
209. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Hamilton. 237 F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1956).




trate or explain.21 '
Same-Right of Accused to Examine Exhibit Before Trial: It is
reversible error to deny an accused's handwriting experts an oppor-
tunity to examine before trial an original writing made by accused at
the request of the F.B.I. and studied and used by the prosecution's ex-
perts, where the only basic evidence against accused is said writing.212
Appeal and Error-Scope of Review-Ruling on Motion for New
Trial-Inadequate Damages: Where the verdict for plaintiff in a mali-
cious prosecution action was adequately supported by the evidence on
the issue of liability but the jury awarded as compensatory damages
but a small fraction of the compensatory damages proved by undis-
puted evidence and only nominal punitive damages, the court of
appeals ruled that the trial judge had erred in refusing a new trial on
the issue of damages only and remanded the cause for a new trial on
that issue. There was a vigorous, well-argued dissent on the ground
that the verdict indicated a compromise on the issue of liability.
213
District Courts
Jurisdiction-Personal-Subject Matter-Foreign Corporation Non-
resident Motorist: A foreign corporation does not become subject to
jurisdiction of Tennessee courts by once sending a motor truck into the
state carrying goods consigned to a resident, for such a single trans-
action does not constitute doing business within the state; and a cause
of action arising out of personal injuries caused by a defect in the
corporation's motor vehicle, which injury occurred while plaintiff
was unloading the vehicle, is not one created from use of Tennessee's
highways. Consequently, service of process upon the Secretary of
State in an action for such an injury conferred no jurisdiction over
the corporation.214
Motions Before Trial-Motion for Summary Judgment-Controvert-
ing Allegations in Pleadings: The trial judge recognized that some
cases hold that statements of fact set forth in the pleadings cannot be
controverted by affidavits and documentary evidence so as to warrant
granting summary judgment but declared that they are contrary to
the great weight of authority. When the opponent of the motion does
file counter-affidavits, the question for the court is whether there
exists a genuine issue as to any material fact. After examination of all
materials submitted the judge found that there was no such issue and
granted the motion.
215
211. Smith v. United States. 239 F.2d 168 (6th Cir. 1956).
212. Bass v. United States, 239 F.2d 711 (6th Cir. 1957).
213. Devine v. Patteson, 242 F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1957).
214. Acuff v. Service Welding & Machine Co., 141 F. Supp, 294 (E.D. Tenn.
1956).
215. Thomas v. Chamberlain, 143 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Tenn. 1955), aff'd, 236
F.2d 417 (6th Cir. 1956).
'1184 [ VOL. 10
PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE
Burden of Proof and Presumptions-Cause of Illness in Workmen's
Compensation: The trial judge found sufficient evidence to warrant
as a reasonable inference the conclusion that plaintiff's disease was the
result of poisoning causally connected with exposures thereto in his
,employment and that this satisfied his burden of persuasion. He de-
clared that where experts disagree upon this question of causation
"the presumptions as to cause should be resolved in the employee's
favor." The opinion as a whole makes it difficult to determine the pro-
cedural effect of a presumption in its relation to the burden of per-
suading the trier to make the desired finding.
216
Jurisdiction-Subject Matter-Comity: A state court of Tennessee
has jurisdiction to try and sentence a person indicted for a crime com-
mitted in Tennessee although at the time of trial he was on probation
under sentence of a United States District Court. The exercise of
such jurisdiction raises a question of comity, not of power as between
the United States court and the state court.
217
Parties-Bringing in Additional-Third Party Defendant: Section
20-120 of the Tennessee Code was interpreted by the trial judge as
authorizing defendant to bring in as a third party defendant a person
who was liable to plaintiff for the wrong for which plaintiff was suing,
but held that since the party sought to be brought in by defendant was
of the same citizenship as plaintiff, the motion to bring him in must
be denied and the third party complaint stricken2 18 The decision is
no longer of importance because section 20-120 was repealed by chap-
ter 33 of the Tennessee Public Acts of 1957.
Judicial Notice-Matter of Common Knowledge: That the climbing
of stairs is regarded by the medical profession as among the activities
most harmful and dangerous to a person afflicted with arteriosclerosis
and angina is judicially noticeable.
219
Opinion-Expert Opinion-Weight: When medical expert witnesses
disagree as to the existence of a causal relation between an injury
and exposure to a risk arising out of and in the course of the injured
person's work, the trial judge is free to make his own determination
consistent with reason.22 0
LEGISLATION
The following enactments of the 1957 Session of the Tennessee Gen-
eral Assembly dealing with procedural subjects are of special signifi-
cance to the practising lawyer. Chapter references are to Tennessee
Public Acts 1957.
216. Lyons v. Holston Defense Corp., 142 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Tenn. 1956).
217. Eaves v. Edwards, 143 F. Supp. 229 (M.D. Tenn. 1955).
218. Day v. North American Rayon Corp., 140 F. Supp. 490 (E.D. Tenn. 1956).




Jurisdiction-Subject Matter: Chapter 195, amending section 23-
1201 of the Tennessee Code, provides that the circuit court has juris-
diction concurrent with the chancery court to remove the disability of
minority only to enable the minor to receive proceeds in settlement.
Same-Service of Process: Chapter 8221 authorizes service upon the
Deputy Insurance Commissioner in specified actions against an insur-
ance company. Chapter 61 amends section 20-224 of the Tennessee
Code, the nonresident motorist statute, by defining "non-resident" so
as to include any person who has been absent from the state for at least
thirty days next preceding the day process is lodged with the Secre-
tary of State, even though that person is a resident of the state and
owner of a vehicle registered or licensed in this state.
Chapter 100222 authorizes service by publication in actions to annul
a marriage; and chapter 38223 provides that certified mail may be used
instead of registered mail in giving notice required by law.
Pleading: Chapter 74224 requires that the bill in a divorce action set
forth detailed vital statistics concerning the spouse and minor chil-
dren, which the clerk is to certify to the Division of Vital Statistics,
and chapter 46225 authorizes deletion of scurrilous matter from di-
vorce bills. Chapter 153226 makes a long-overdue amendment of
Chancery Court practice and pleading by providing that a sworn an-
swer in Chancery, even when required by a bill of discovery or when
oath to the answer is not waived, shall have no more weight or effect
than the deposition of the defendant filing such an answer.
Parties: Section 20-120 of the Tennessee Code, a very badly drawn
provision authorizing a third party defendant if primarily liable, to be
brought in, is repealed by chapter 33.
Evidence: Chapter 68 amends section 24-509 of the Tennessee Code
by broadening its scope and continuing to require a denial under oath.
"An account on which action is brought, coming from another state
or another county of this state or from the county where the suit is
brought" (with requisite affidavit or certificate) "is conclusive against
defendant unless denied under oath." [italics added.]
Chapter 154227 enacts the Uniform Business Records Act. This is
welcome legislation, although our courts have shown an increasingly
liberal attitude in dealing with business records as evidence.
Chapter 30228 deals with blood group tests in actions where paternity
221. TEiN. CODE ANx. § 56-303 (Supp. 1957).
222. Id. § 36-834 (Supp. 1957).
223. Id. § 1-311 (Supp. 1957).
224. Id. §§ 36-805, 53-450 (Supp. 1957).
225. Id. § 36-805 (Supp. 1957).
226. Id. § 21-628 (Supp. 1957).
227. Id. §§ 24-712 to -715 (Supp. 1957).
228. Id. § 24-716 (Supp. 1957).
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is in issue. On motion of the putative father the court may order him
and the mother and child to submit to such blood grouping tests as
may be necessary to determine whether he can be excluded as the
father. The judge designates the qualified expert to make the test. The
evidence is admissible where the results of the tests indicate exclusion.
This limit is imposed, presumably, because of the acceptance of the
biologic law which makes it impossible for the blood of a child to be
entirely free of certain characteristics of the blood group of his
father. The relevance of the presence of some characteristics is gen-
erally thought to be too slight to be worth consideration, except in
unusual situations.
Chapter 3622 provides for the admissibility in evidence of micro-
photographic records made by banks, but does not include microphoto-
graphs of wills.
Presumptions: Chapter 3723 is phrased in terms of conclusive pre-
sumptions. If a bank establishes the fact that it mailed a statement
of account to a depositor at his last known address and no response
or objection is made within six years thereafter, it is conclusively
presumed that the statement was correct.
Chapter 123 amends section 59-1037 of the Tennessee Code, which is
framed in the ambiguous phrasing of prima facie evidence. The
original section made proof of ownership of a motor vehicle prima facie
evidence that it was being used with the owner's knowledge and
consent. The amendment makes ownership prima facie evidence that
the vehicle was being operated by the owner or by his employee for his
benefit and in the course and scope of employment.
Appeal and Error: Chapter 177 amends section 27-322 of the Tennes-
see Code by enlarging the period of time in which the clerk may
transmit the transcript. It provides that if a bill of exceptions is to
be part of the transcript or is to accompany it, the forty-day period
shall not commence until the bill is filed or the time for filing it has
expired, whichever occurs first.
229. Id. § 45-433 (Supp. 1957).
230. Id. § 45-432 (Supp. 1957).
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